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Preface
This thesis consists of four independent essays that deal with diﬀerent topics within the
ﬁeld of economics of education. The essay in chapter 1 is joint work with Edwin Leuven
and Hessel Oosterbeek. The essay in chapter 4 is joint work with Jon H. Fiva and is
forthcoming in the Regional Science and Urban Economics.
Leuven and Oosterbeek are both aﬃliated with the Department of Economics at the
University of Amsterdam and the Tinbergen Institute. Leuven is also aﬃliated with the
CEPR, CREST-INSEE and IZA. Fiva was aﬃliated with the Department of Economics
at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology when we started to write Chapter
4. Fiva is currently aﬃliated with Department of Economics, University of Oslo.
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Introduction
Norwegian investment in education in terms of money and in terms of time is substantial.
In 2003 Norway spent 4.8 percent of GDP on education compared to a 3.8 percent OECD
average. There is however contradictory evidence whether resources alone is suﬃcient to
guarantee educational success. During more than a decade, the common wisdom among
economists was that extra resources for education - measured as the teacher-pupil ratio
or as expenditure per pupil - have no systematic relation with student achievement.
This view was mainly based on Hanushek’s (1986) inﬂuential review of the literature.
Recently this received wisdom has been challenged by a series of studies that use more
elaborate methods to identify the causal impact of class size on achievement (Krueger,
1999; Angrist and Lavy, 1999).
The eﬀect of class size on student achievement is still one of the unresolved issues in
education research. It is by now well understood that endogeneity problems may severely
bias naive OLS-estimates because of sorting of students and teachers, and the targeting
of educational resources. Thus exogenous sources of variation in class size are key for
a credible identiﬁcation of the class size eﬀect. Various recent studies acknowledge this
and apply convincing identiﬁcation methods. This has, however, not led to a deﬁnite
conclusion about the magnitude or even the sign of the class size eﬀect. For instance,
the studies reporting negative eﬀects of class size vary considerably in the size of this
eﬀect thereby limiting the relevance of these results for policy conclusions.
The ﬁrst paper in this thesis (Chapter 1) provides evidence about the eﬀect of class
size on achievement in Norwegian lower secondary schools. This evidence is obtained
from two diﬀerent and independent approaches (Angrist and Lavy, 1999; Hoxby, 2000).
The results consistently point to a lack of any impact of class size on achievement. Eﬀects
as small as 1.5 percent of a standard deviation for a one student change in class size
during three consecutive years, can be ruled out. This holds irrespective of identiﬁcation
method, and indicate that decreasing class size is ineﬀective in raising average student
achievement in lower secondary education in Norway.
The empirical literature on the impact of school inputs on educational performance
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increasingly recognizes that they cannot be well summarized by an average eﬀect. The
eﬀects of diﬀerent educational policies are very likely to vary across pupils from diﬀerent
family backgrounds. One important mechanism in this respect is substitution between
the quality of the school environment and the quality of the home environment. This
explains why such eﬀects are typically bigger for children from disadvantage backgrounds
(e.g. Guryan, 2001; Lindahl, 2001; Card and Payne, 2002; Papke, 2005).
The second paper in the thesis (Chapter 2) takes a slightly diﬀerent approach and
focus on complementarity between school inputs and the quality of the home environ-
ment. It does so by considering homework given to Dutch elementary school pupils. To
the extent that parental input complements homework, we expect students from higher
socioeconomic backgrounds to beneﬁt more from homework assignments. The results in-
dicate that the test score gap is indeed larger in classes where everybody gets homework
than in classes where nobody gets homework. More precisely we ﬁnd that pupils be-
longing to the upper part of the socioeconomic status scale beneﬁt, whereas pupils from
the lowest part are unaﬀected. Since we consider the eﬀect of homework on within class
diﬀerences, confounding eﬀects of unobserved teacher characteristics drop out as long
as they are homogeneous. Moreover, potential biases arising from unobserved school
quality and pupil selection are accounted for by exploiting variation within schools.
The potential negative results with respect to the eﬀectiveness of money based edu-
cational policies (school inputs) are also accompanied by i) a growing consensus that
teachers are a crucial element to secure educational success of students (e.g. Rivkin et
al. 2005), and ii) and increased interest in ﬁnancial incentives as a way to motivate
teachers, students and also other actors that play a role in the students learning (e.g.
Lavy, 2002). Chapter 3 and 4 take a closer look at these two aspects.
In Norway, like in many other countries, the education sector faces high absenteeism
rates. In upper secondary education 11 percent of the classes are canceled because of
teacher absence (OECD, 2003). Accordingly there are reasons to believe that teacher
absenteeism has a negative impact on student learning. It is therefore surprising that
teacher absenteeism has not been devoted more space yet in the literature. Especially
since observed measures on teacher quality like education and experience turn out to
explain very little of the variation in student outcome (Hanushek, 2002). Studies on
both the eﬀect of teacher absenteeism on pupil learning as well as possible factors that
explain teacher absenteeism are lacking in the literature.
The third paper in this thesis (chapter 3) analyzes the eﬀects of workplace charac-
teristics on absenteeism among teachers working in the Norwegian primary and lower
14
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secondary school. These characteristics are of interest because they may signal that
some teachers are put under higher working pressure. For instance, teachers facing high
pupil teacher ratios may have a more tiresome work day than teachers facing lower pupil
teacher ratios. Moreover, teachers working in schools with many disadvantage students
may be more often confronted with stressful situations. Teachers working hours and con-
tract type are also considered in the model because the literature has found these two
variables to be important determinants for teacher absenteeism (Leuven, 2006; Bradley
et al., 2007). Exploiting intertemporal variation within teachers who have not changed
schools, the ﬁndings indicate that the teachers lower their amount of absenteeism if the
school’s resource use increases. Increased work hours and a permanent work contract are
also associated with higher absenteeism. When stratifying on the teachers age, increased
workload appears to have a larger impact on old teachers.
The potential for ﬁnancial incentives to successfully increase performance in the school
sector has recently attracted attention. Both for teachers as in Lavy (2002), and for stu-
dents as in Angrist and Lavy (2002) and Leuven et al. (2003). The last paper in this
thesis (chapter 4) concerns ﬁnancial incentives aimed at school bureaucrats and focus on
organizational aspects within the school district and its eﬀect on student outcome. More
precisely it is an empirical investigation of theoretical contributions by Glaeser (1996)
and Hoxby (1999) which highlight the favorable incentive eﬀects of property taxation
on public service providers. The mechanism is assumed to work through capitalization
of school quality into housing prices. This involves that school bureaucrats in school
districts that levy residential property taxation get incentives to deliver high quality on
their services because it is associated with increased income. The institutional setting in
Norway is well suited for analyzing the eﬀects of property taxation because we can com-
pare school districts with and without property taxation. To take into account potential
endogeneity of the choice of implementing property taxation, we rely on instrumental
variables techniques. The empirical results suggest that students in school districts that
levy property taxation perform better on the national examination.
This thesis consists of four independent papers that all deal with diﬀerent topics within
the ﬁeld of economics of education. Chapter 1 and 2 concern school inputs in educational
production and focus on both homogeneous and heterogeneous eﬀects. Chapter 3 and 4
are more related to organizational tasks both within schools and within school districts.
The studies presented in this thesis contribute to the literature in the sense that they
improve on measurement and address new questions. Yet it only covers a small fraction of
the whole literature, and future research should therefore further expand the knowledge
15
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about how to implement successful and eﬀective educational and teacher labor market
policies.
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1 Quasi-experimental estimates of
the eﬀect of class size on
achievement in Norway
1.1 Introduction
One of the still unresolved issues in education research concerns the eﬀects of class size
on students’ achievement. It is by now well-understood that endogeneity problems may
severely bias naive OLS-estimates of the class size eﬀect, and that exogenous sources of
variation in class size are key for a credible identiﬁcation of the class size eﬀect. Various
recent studies acknowledge this and apply convincing identiﬁcation methods. This has,
however, not led to a deﬁnite conclusion about the magnitude or even the sign of the
class size eﬀect.
Most of the (quasi-)experimental studies report that a reduction in class size boosts
achievement (Angrist and Lavy, 1999; Krueger, 1999; Boozer and Rouse, 2001; Browning
and Heinesen, 2006; Urquiola, 2006), other studies which also exploit credible identiﬁca-
tion strategies conclude the opposite (Hanushek et al., 1996; Hoxby, 2000). Moreover,
the studies reporting negative class size eﬀects vary considerably in the size of this eﬀect
thereby limiting the relevance of these results for policy conclusions.
Of course there need not be a universal eﬀect of class size reduction on achievement.
Eﬀects may vary with characteristics of the students aﬀected by the policy, or by con-
textual factors such as remedial instruction for low performing students or the quality
of teachers’ education (cf. Wößmann and West, 2006). This would imply that for policy
purposes, studies have to be conducted for separate levels of education and for separate
countries (or perhaps for groups of very similar countries).
This paper provides evidence about the eﬀect of class size in Norwegian lower sec-
ondary schools on achievement. This evidence is obtained from two diﬀerent and in-
dependent approaches. The ﬁrst approach uses exogenous variation due to maximum
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class size rules in Norwegian lower secondary education. This approach was ﬁrst used
by Angrist and Lavy (1999). The second approach exploits variation in actual class size
that is attributable to demographic variation. This approach was applied previously by
Hoxby (2000).
Some features of our study are worth emphasizing. First, for this study we have access
to an extraordinary rich dataset. The dataset covers two entire cohorts of students
participating in nationwide tests in the schoolyears 2001/02 and 2002/03. The data are
administrative thereby giving rise to no or only little measurement error in actual class
size and enrollment. Achievement is measured as high stake test scores, thereby also
reducing measurement error in the dependent variables. Together, these characteristics
of the dataset enable us to produce very precise estimates of class size eﬀects. Secondly,
for all students in our sample we know actual class sizes during the three years they
spent in lower secondary school. This allows a clear-cut interpretation of the eﬀects that
we estimate.
Furthermore, no previous study has presented precise estimates of the eﬀects of class
size on achievement for any of the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway and
Sweden). Previous studies have either considered other outcomes than achievement
such as years of education (Bingley et al., 2005; Browning and Heinesen, 2006), or used
a very small sample therefore lacking precision (Bonesrønning, 2003; Lindahl, 2005).
Finally, most of the evidence on class size eﬀects pertains to primary education, our
study is among the few dealing with class size eﬀects in lower secondary education.1;2
The results reported in this paper consistently point to a lack of any impact of class
size on achievement. Eﬀects as small as 1.5 percent of a standard deviation for a one
student change in class size during three consecutive years, can be ruled out. This holds
irrespective of identiﬁcation method (maximum class size rule or demographic variation),
subject tested (math, languages) or the control variables included in the regressions. The
ﬁnding also holds across various subgroups of the population and is also independent of
teacher characteristics.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section gives a brief
summary of related studies. Section 1.3 describes the relevant institutional features of
the Norwegian educational system. Section 2.2 gives a description of the data employed
1For a subsample of our schools we can also conduct analyses using class size in primary school as a
class size measure. We have chosen not to present these results since they are very similar to the
results for lower secondary schools.
2Häkkinen et al. (2003) is a study at the lower secondary level for Finland, but they look at a broader
measure of school resources.
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in the empirical analysis. Section 1.5 continues with an exposition of the empirical
approaches applied in this paper and their limitations. Section 1.6 presents and discusses
the main ﬁndings. Section 1.7 investigates the possibility of heterogeneous class size
eﬀects, and Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 Related literature
During more than a decade, the common wisdom among economists was that extra
resources for education - measured as the teacher-pupil ratio or as expenditures per
pupil - have no systematic relation with students’ achievement. This view was mainly
based on Hanushek’s (1986) inﬂuential review of the literature. Only recently has this
received wisdom been challenged by a series of studies that use experimental and quasi-
experimental approaches to identify the causal impact of class size on achievement.
Krueger (1999) analyzes data from a large-scale ﬁeld experiment conducted in the
state of Tennessee. Students and their teachers were randomly assigned to a group of
regular size (22-25 students), to a group of regular size including a teaching assistent, or
to a small group (13-17), during their ﬁrst four years in school. Krueger’s ﬁndings are
in line with what other people have reported about this project namely that students
in smaller classes perform better on standardized achievement tests. Scores increase by
four percentile points for the ﬁrst year that a student is exposed to a small class and
by one percentile point for each subsequent year. In a follow-up study, Krueger and
Whitmore (2001) demonstrate that reduced class sizes in early school years can have
long-lasting eﬀects. Students who attended small classes in this experiment are more
likely to take a college-entrance exam and have somewhat higher test scores. The eﬀect
on exam taking are mainly concentrated among minority students.
Angrist and Lavy (1999) were the ﬁrst to exploit the exogenous variation generated
by maximum class size rules to obtain quasi-experimental estimates of the class size
eﬀect on achievement. They exploit the fact that according to oﬃcial guidelines for
Israeli public schools, maximum class size equals 40. If the size of an enrollment cohort
in a school exceeds (a multiple of) 40, an extra class should be created. This rule
creates discontinuities in the relation between cohort enrollment size and class size, which
Angrist and Lavy then use in a regression discontinuity framework to identify the eﬀect
of class size on achievement.3 When they do not correct for endogeneity bias, their
3In section 1.5 we will discuss their identiﬁcation strategy in more detail because we will apply the
same method in this paper.
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estimates point to a positive relation between class size and achievement. In contrast
to that, estimates based on the discontinuities in grade enrollment point to a negative
eﬀect of class size on achievement.
Other papers exploiting maximum class size rules include Bonesrønning (2003) for
Norway, Urquiola (2006) for Bolivia, Piketty (2004) and Gary-Bobo and Mahjoub (2006)
for France, Browning and Heinesen (2006) and Bingley et al. (2005) for Denmark, and
Wößmann (2005) for Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Norway,
Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. Especially the papers by Bonesrønning and Wößmann
are of interest for the analysis presented in this paper because they also deal with class
size eﬀects in Norway. Bonesrønning uses data from a small-scale self-collected dataset.
Class size eﬀects are estimated using the discontinuity at 30 as an instrument for actual
class size. The reported eﬀects depend on the exact speciﬁcation but vary between
0.13 and 0.26 of a standard deviation for a 10-students reduction in class size, and are
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero but not very precisely estimated. The main diﬀerences
between this study and ours are the following: (i) we apply two diﬀerent methods rather
than only one; (ii) we employ a much larger dataset, so that our estimates have much
more precision; (iii) we use high-stake exam scores as our achievement measure (iv) in
our regression discontinuity speciﬁcations we include controls for enrollment in a grade,
something that Bonesrønning does not.
Wößmann uses data from 38 Norwegian schools (1,351 pupils) who participated in
TIMSS. Not including controls for enrollment produces a small but signiﬁcantly negative
estimate of the class size eﬀect. This eﬀect vanishes once a controls for enrollment is
included in the speciﬁcation. Interestingly, Wößmann uses a cutoﬀ of 28 rather than
on 30 arguing that gives the best ﬁt to his data so that it seems that this implicit rule
is actually used in most Norwegian schools. This “letting the data decide” approach
is at odds with the basic philosophy underlying the regression discontinuity approach
because assignment to treatment and control is no longer based on an exogenous rule
but on schools’ choices.
Hoxby (2000) uses demographic variation to identify the class size eﬀect. She exploits
that - after correcting for a trend - cohort sizes within school districts can be larger or
smaller in some years than in others.4 Using data of elementary school pupils in the
state of Conneciticut, she does not ﬁnd any statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of class size
on student achievement, and her estimates are precise enough to rule out even modest
eﬀects.
4This method will also be discussed in more detail in section 1.5.
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Two recent papers apply identiﬁcation strategies in the same spirit as Hoxby’s ap-
proach, although both studies do not control for a trend in cohort size. Urquiola (2006)
identiﬁes the class size eﬀect using variation in population size between school in rural
areas that are so small that fewer than 30 students (a number that ﬁts in one class) are
enrolled. These schools are more likely to be in small communities where class size is
mainly determined by cohort size. Urquiola uses data from third graders in Bolivia and
ﬁnds signiﬁcantly negative eﬀects of class size on achievement.
Wößmann and West (2006) exploit within-school diﬀerences in average class size be-
tween adjacent grades. An attractive feature of their study is that it uses data from
students in 11 diﬀerent countries, although this comes at the price that numbers of
(identifying) observations are in some cases rather small and precision therefore low.
Sizeable positive eﬀects of smaller classes are reported for Greece and Iceland, for four
countries even small class size eﬀects can be ruled out, and for another four countries
large beneﬁcial eﬀects can be ruled out. As an explanation for the diﬀerences in class size
eﬀects across countries, Wößmann and West advance the hypothesis that smaller classes
are only beneﬁcial where/when the average capability of the teaching force appears to
be low.
Finally, Lindahl (2005) implements a value added approach to estimate the eﬀect of
class size using Swedish data. He fails to ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant class size eﬀects
using standard value added methods. When he identiﬁes the class size eﬀect by taking
the diﬀerence between school- and summer-period test score changes, he does ﬁnd that
class size matters. We are not able to implement this approach because we do not have
repeated achievement measures for the students in our sample.
The variation in the ﬁndings reviewed here is reﬂected in the controversy between
two of the leading education economists, see: Krueger (2003) versus Hanushek (2003).
In an attempt to reconcile both views, Todd and Wolpin (2003) stress the diﬀerence
between policy eﬀects and parameters of the education production function. According
to these authors, estimates of the class size eﬀect obtained from experimental and quasi-
experimental research designs should be interpreted as policy eﬀects, whereas estimates
obtained from non-experimental research designs are aimed at the identiﬁcation of the
education production function. To learn about the production technology, one needs
exogenous variation in class size holding other inputs constant. To learn about the policy
impact, one needs exogenous variation in class size not holding other inputs constant. An
important other input not controlled in experimental and quasi-experimental studies is
the input of parents. Parents may for instance respond to a reduction in class size by
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spending less time teaching their children at home. In that case school and parental
inputs are substitutes and the policy eﬀect will be smaller than the technological eﬀect.
In principle, school and parental inputs can also work as complements in which case the
policy eﬀect would exceed the technological eﬀect. A similar line of reasoning holds with
respect to for example teacher eﬀort. Hægeland et al. (2007) argue that the maximum
class size rule is accompanied by a similar input substitution in terms of school resources.
We will show that this is not a concern for our ﬁndings. When we replace class size by
a commonly used measure for school resources in Norway we ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences
around the discontinuities and our results for achievement are unchanged.
This brief review of related studies only includes studies by economists. For a recent
review of the class size literature from a non-economic perspective (although references
to most of the studies cited above are included) see Hattie (2005). His reading of the
literature is that class size eﬀects are often very small, and he proposes as a candidate
explanation that teachers tend to use the same teaching methods independent of class
size.
1.3 Institutional Settings
Compulsory schools in Norway are run and owned by multipurpose local governments.5
Municipalities receive funding to run their various activities (including schools) through
a combination of a local income tax, property taxes and transfers from the central
government (see f.e Hægeland et al. (2007) for more details).
For the students in our sample compulsory schooling consisted of nine years; grades
1 to 6 in primary school; and grades 7 to 9 in lower secondary school.6 Less than
three percent of the students are enrolled in private schools. Thus private schools do
not provide a realistic alternative to public schools and are therefore dropped from the
analysis. Schools have catchment areas, implying that parental school choice between
schools for given residence is not allowed. Most students go to separate primary and
lower secondary schools, but because of the rural settlement pattern in Norway about 23
percent of the students are enrolled in so-called “combined” schools. These are schools
5In addition to compulsory public schooling local governments are responsible for elderly care,
preschool education, and infrastructure. Spending on education consists of about 30% of total
spending of the available budget. In Norway the names local school district, local government and
municipality are interchangable.
6From the school year 1997/98 onwards it became compulsory to start schooling at the age of 6
(instead of 7), and from then on 10 years of schooling was implemented in Norway. The reform was
implemented in such a way that the length of primary school was extended with one year.
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that oﬀer both primary and lower secondary education. Students who start taking their
primary education in a combined school typically continue to take their lower secondary
education there because of lack of school choice for given residence and moving costs.
Combined schools are often situated in relatively rural areas.
Another feature of the Norwegian compulsory school system is that grade retention
almost never happens. Strøm (2004) attributes this to “the strong integration and equal-
izing policy that all students within a cohort should be treated equal, and be given
education in their ordinary classes.” As a result, at the end of compulsory schooling all
Norwegian students have identical length of schooling. This is important for our analysis
since we have data at the student level of the nationwide tests conducted in 2001/2 and
2002/3 and of class size from these years as well as from previous years. Because students
do not repeat grades we know the class size history of individual students during their
stay in lower secondary school. We will use this information to construct our preferred
class size measure (see below). According to anecdotal evidence, movements of students
between schools are quite rare.7
1.4 Data
1.4.1 Test scores
We use administrative enrollment data from Statistics Norway that cover all students
who were in the ﬁnal grade of lower secondary school (9th grade) during the school
years 2001/2002 or 2002/2003. We merged this dataset with test score data from cen-
tralized exit exams (also from Statistics Norway). The students in Norway have to sit
such exams at the end of their ﬁnal school year in lower secondary.8 Their results on
this exam are important for further schooling possibilities (which is upper secondary
education), and the exam is considered to be a high stake test by all parties involved;
students, their parents, teachers and school administrators.9 Although the curriculum
includes many diﬀerent subjects a written centralized exam is only undertaken in three
subjects: mathematics, English and Norwegian.10 To reduce the administrative burden
7We are not aware of any study documenting the extent of students’ school mobility in Norway.
8Although this exit exam existed already for many years, its results became available for research
purposes for the ﬁrst time in the schoolyear 2001/02.
9Although all students have the right to continue at upper secondary schools and above 95 percent do
so, their choice set among diﬀerent schools and diﬀerent study tracks depends on their achievement
in lower secondary schools.
10In Norway there are two oﬃcial written languages, main Norwegian (Hovedmål) and a second Norwe-
gian language (Sidemål), and students who are examined in Norwegian get a score on both languages.
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each student takes the exam in one subject only. In which subject a student will take
the exam, is determined by a random device shortly before the exams take place so that
students have minimal scope to prepare for that speciﬁc subject only. Students are told
only three school days in advance in which subject they are going to make the exam. All
students in the same class do their exam in the same subject, but students in diﬀerent
classes of the same school may sit their exam in diﬀerent subjects.
The grading of the exams is on a scale running from 1 to 6, where 1 is fail, 2 the lowest
pass and 6 is the top score. The distributions of test scores have a bell curve shape, and
there are no signs of ﬂoor or ceiling eﬀects (low frequencies for 1 and 6). Average scores
for each of the four subjects are around 3.5 with standard deviations almost equal to 1.
1.4.2 Class size
class size information comes from the Norwegian Ministry of Education (Grunnskolens
Informasjonssystem) which registers, for all schools in Norway, the number of classes
per grade. We combine this information with the enrollment data mentioned above to
calculate for each student average class size at the grade level as
class size = enrollment/# classes:
Note that we have data on average class size per grade and not actual class size (except
when schools have exactly one class in the grade). It is important to note that this
eliminates biases resulting from within school sorting, while the associated measurement
error is removed by our 2SLS approach.
An attractive feature of the data is that we do not only have information on con-
temporaneous class size (the school year of the exam) but also on class size during the
previous years in which the students that have been tested were in lower secondary
school. We make use of this extra information. Unfortunately class sizes across years
within the same school are too highly correlated to examine their separate impacts (the
correlations are always higher than 0.9). We therefore have chosen to estimate the eﬀect
of class size as the average class size during the three years of lower secondary school.
In this way we avoid confounding the impact of class size in grade 9 with the impact of
class size in earlier grades. Moreover, impact estimates of class size deﬁned this way are
relevant from a policy point of view. Hoxby (2000) also focusses on the average class
size a cohort has experienced up until the time it takes the test.
Figure 1.1 shows the distribution of class size in lower secondary schools. This ﬁgure
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Figure 1.1 – Distribution of class size
shows that the majority of classes have between 20 and 30 students in it. A substantial
fraction (35%) of the classes does, however, have fewer than 20 students. The (un-
weighted) average class size is equal to 20 (s.d. 7.4). The graph also suggests that the
maximum class size of 30 is enforced; no class has a size exceeding the threshold of 30.
And that the maximum class size is binding; without the restriction the distribution
would have had some mass above 30.
1.4.3 Control variables
From other administrative databases we merged information on students’ age, gender,
ethnic minority background, household income, whether parents live together or not, and
years of education of both parents. Comparable information is available and exploited
in most (but not all) other studies examining the eﬀect of class size on achievement.
We also control for a number of teacher characteristics. We use employer register
data on the teachers from the Ministry of Labor and Government Administration. Since
we are not able to link teachers and students we aggregate the teacher data up to the
school level where we weigh with the "workload per teacher". Included teacher controls
are experience, gender, temporary contract and years of schooling. Finally we include
the (log) size of the school district measured in terms of inhabitants and the number of
people in the school district who live in rural areas. We also control for whether schools
are combined schools.
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Table 1.1 presents descriptive statistics of the control variables. Half of the students is
female, the average age is 14.5 years, the average levels of fathers’ and mothers’ education
are almost equal, only 3 percent of the sample consists of students with an immigrant
background, and 30 percent of the students do not live in a household with both parents
present. Almost a quarter of the students attends a school combining primary and lower
secondary education, (weighted by numbers of students) average class size equals 24 and
grade 7 enrollment equals 84.5. Teachers have on average 4.6 years of teacher training,
18.8 years of work experience as a teacher, 56 percent of the teachers is women and 17
percent of the teachers is on a temporary contract (again all weighted by numbers of
students).11
Class size is not distributed randomly in the population because of sorting of students
and teachers, and the targetting of educational resources. This is illustrated by Table
1.2 which reports the results of regressions of actual (average) class size on individual,
teacher and school characteristics. The ﬁrst column reports the results of a regression
that only includes students’ characteristics. This shows that actual class size increases
with family income, with parents’ levels of education, with parents being immigrants, and
with parents not living together. When we add to this speciﬁcation characteristics of the
district, the positive eﬀects of family income and parents’ education remain signiﬁcant
but become smaller. The eﬀect of having an immigrant background reverses (and is
almost signiﬁcantly negative) and the eﬀect of living in a household with both parents
present is no longer signiﬁcant (and also changed sign). These latter results indicate that
immigrant families and separated parents are concentrated in more densely populated
districts. The results in Table 1.2 make clear that class size is not randomly distributed
across students, and hence that some strategy is called for to identify the eﬀects of class
size on achievement. The next section discusses in detail the approaches that we will
pursue.
1.5 Empirical approaches
We follow the literature and assume that achievement of student i (yi) is generated by
the following equation:
yi = x
0
i¯ + w
0
s(i)®+ ± ¢ css(i) + ´s(i) + Ãt(i) + ²i (1.1)
11Student characteristics are measured at the moment of testing, whereas school and teacher information
relates to October 1st of the schoolyear.
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Table 1.1 – Sample summary statistics
Mean s.d.
(1) (2)
Individual characteristics
Girl 0.49 (0.50)
Age 14.53 (0.31)
ln(family income) 13.24 (0.75)
Education mother (years) 11.92 (2.89)
Education father (years) 12.20 (3.13)
1st or 2nd generation immigrants 0.05 (0.22)
Parents non-cohabiting 0.31 (0.46)
ln(pop. size school district) 10.05 (1.47)
ln(rural pop. size school district) 7.95 (0.75)
School characteristics:
Combined school 0.20 (0.40)
Average class size grades 7-10 24.32 (4.20)
Enrollment grade 7 84.98 (41.79)
Teacher characteristics
current (year t)
Average teacher education (years) 4.61 (0.20)
Average teacher experience 18.86 (3.28)
Fraction of female teachers 0.56 (0.11)
Fraction of teachers with a temp. contract 0.17 (0.11)
Year=2002 0.52 0.50
N 115,084
N schools 1,000
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Table 1.2 – Regression of actual class size on observables
(1) (2)
Girl 0:019 0:019
(0:029) (0:026)
Age ¡0:064 0:071
(0:051) (0:046)
ln(family income) 0:430 0:168
(0:042)¤¤¤ (0:025)¤¤¤
Education mother (years) 0:047 0:012
(0:008)¤¤¤ (0:007)¤
Education father (years) 0:104 0:036
(0:009)¤¤¤ (0:006)¤¤¤
1st or 2nd generation immigrants 1:313 ¡0:223
(0:155)¤¤¤ (0:138)
Parents non-cohabiting 0:244 ¡0:017
(0:045)¤¤¤ (0:040)
ln(pop. size school district) 1:211
(0:068)¤¤¤
ln(rural pop. size school district) 0:434
(0:148)¤¤¤
Year=2002 0:097
(0:130)
adj. R-squared 0:0192 0:2103
N 115,084 115,084
N schools 1,000 1,000
28
Quasi-experimental estimates of the eﬀect of class size on achievement in Norway
xi is a vector of observable attributes of the student and his parents, ws(i) a vector of
observable school and teacher characteristics and s(i) identiﬁes the school of pupil i,
css(i) is the average class size that student i attended during her school career in school
s, ´s(i) a school eﬀect, Ãt(i) is an eﬀect for the year in which student i is in her ﬁnal
year of lower secondary school (2001/2 or 2002/3) and ²i is all other determinants of
achievement such as unobserved attributes of the student, parents and community. The
coeﬃcient of interest is ±, the class size eﬀect. Note that a value-added speciﬁcation is
not feasible because achievement is only measured at the end of lower secondary school.
Table 1.3 shows the relation between student achievement and class size estimated
using OLS. Results are presented from various speciﬁcations and separately for mathe-
matics and languages, where we have pooled English and the two Norwegian subjects
(and included subject dummies). Columns (1) and (4) are obtained from a speciﬁcation
without covariates; both estimates are positive and signiﬁcant, indicating that pupils
in larger classes perform better than pupils in smaller classes. The results in columns
(2) and (5) are obtained from a speciﬁcation that includes individual characteristics as
controls, while columns (3) and (6) report the results from speciﬁcations that also in-
clude school and teacher characteristics. We control for school district characteristics
in speciﬁcations (2), (3), (5) and (6). Including controls produces negative and highly
statistically signiﬁcant estimates on class size in all speciﬁcations. If we were to give
these estimates credence, we would say that a one pupil reduction in class size improves
test scores by between 0.4 and 0.6 percent of a standard deviation. The estimates ex-
clude, however, class size eﬀects larger than 1 percent of a standard deviation with 95%
probability.
To address the potential endogeneity of class size we need variation in actual average
class size that is arguably not subject to the choices of parents and schools’ principals or
teachers. We exploit two sources of such exogenous variation, one induced by a maximum
class size rule and one based on population variation. The next two subsections describe
brieﬂy what these methods entail and how these can be implemented in the Norwegian
context.
1.5.1 Maximum class size rules
Lower secondary schools in Norway are subject to maximum class size rules of 30 students
per class. This rule creates a discontinuous relation between enrollment and class size.
Just above multiples of 30 class size drops substantially. Following Angrist and Lavy
(1999) we exploit this maximum class size rule in a regression discontinuity design. For
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this approach to work, schools need to be located randomly around the thresholds and
no other discontinuities that may aﬀect outcomes should exist.
Although identiﬁcation in the regression discontinuity design is ultimately local (e.g.
Hahn et al., 2001), Angrist and Lavy also proposed to instrument actual class size
with predicted class size while conditioning on a smooth function of enrollment which
is supposed to capture any direct eﬀect of this variable on achievement. This identi-
fying assumption essentially boils down to an exclusion restriction with respect to the
discontinuities. In the analyses we will control for a cubic function of enrollment. An
alternative for controlling for a smooth function of cohort enrollment is to restrict the
sample to the regions around the kinks. We will present separate results from analyses
for a sample which is restricted to schools with cohort enrollment in grade 7 at most 5
students away from the kinks.
Our analysis diﬀers from previous analyses because we use predicted class size in grade
7, the ﬁrst year in lower secondary school, to instrument average class size during the
three years in lower secondary school. The reason behind this is that cohort enrollment
in grades 8 and 9 and thereby predicted class size in these grades may depend on actual
class size in grade 7, and is therefore potentially endogenous. Such dependence could
for instance result from parents’ decisions to move from schools where they experienced
large classes in 7th grade to schools where they observed small classes in 7th grade.12
Figure 1.2 plots predicted class size and average actual class size against cohort en-
rollment. Average actual class size closely tracks predicted class size especially around
the ﬁrst kink.
Like in any regression discontinuity design one needs to ensure that the exclusion
restriction is not violated. One way of testing this is to check for that schools and/or
parents do not sort around the cutoﬀs. We do not observe bunching after the cutoﬀs
in Norway. To go one step further we also compared the characteristics of students
and schools around the kinks. A proper regression discontinuity design is like a local
randomized experiment and observed characteristics should therefore be balanced. Al-
though this is a necessary and not a suﬃcient condition (which also requires balancing
of unobserved characteristics), evidence for balancing is strong support since it seems
diﬃcult to imagine unobservables that matter for outcomes but that are orthogonal to
observables that aﬀect outcomes.
12For students in combined schools enrollment in grade 7, the grade when they enroll in lower secondary
school, may depend on actual class size during the previous primary school period. But the fact
that the maximum class size rule changes from 28 in grade 6 to 30 in grade 7 causes that also in the
combined schools students in grade 7 are confronted with a new class size.
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Figure 1.2 – Average and predicted class size, lower secondary school
To test this, we restricted the sample to students in classes close (at most 5 students
away) to the cutoﬀs. For this sample, we regressed the indicator for being above the
cutoﬀ (versus being below it) on various sets of observable characteristics (including
enrollment). In the speciﬁcation that regresses the above/below indicator on student
characteristics the p-value for joint signiﬁcance of these characteristics equals 0.443. In
the speciﬁcation that regresses the above/below indicator on school characteristics the
p-value for joint signiﬁcance of these characteristics equals 0.495. And the p-value for
joint signiﬁcance of student and school characteristics together equals 0.518. The only
separate variable that comes in marginally signiﬁcant (10%-level) is teachers’ education
(lower above the kinks).
1.5.2 Population variation
The second approach exploits demographic variation and was ﬁrst proposed by Hoxby
(2000). Instead of using the variation in enrollment that – in the presence of a maximum
class size rule – triggers changes in the number of classes (and therefore class size), Hoxby
exploits the population variation conditional on the number of classes.
Variation in enrollment may however correlate with other determinants of student
achievement. This happens for example when more educated parents avoid schools where
enrollment is large, or when better schools face increased demand if parents selectively
choose schools based on school quality. Where part of the variation in enrollment depends
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on (variation in) population characteristics, there is also a random component (u) that
arises from random ﬂuctuations in timing and number of births. Since it seems natural
that the share of the random component in total births does not depend on population
size, it is assumed that u aﬀects e proportionally, thus enrollment for a given school (and
grade level) can be expressed by the following equation:
log(est) = log(¹est) + log(ust) (1.2)
where ¹est is the deterministic part of enrollment, and log(ust) the random part which
captures the random variation in enrollment caused by biology.
It is assumed that log(ust) is not correlated with any of the determinants for student
achievement (xist, wst and ²ist) in equation (1.1), and since log(ust) is correlated with
log(est), a consistent estimate of log(ust) would be a valid instrument for class size.
Hoxby assumes that log(¹est) changes smoothly over time and can be approximated by a
grade-school-speciﬁc intercept and a school-speciﬁc polynomial in time. Equation (1.2)
can therefore be written as
log(est) =
KX
k=0
®skt
k + log(ust) (1.3)
We estimate equation (1.3) for each school separately to obtain the estimated residualsdlog(ust) which serve as the instrument for class size in (1.1). As in the maximum class size
approach we base our instruments on enrollment in grade 7. We have data on enrollment
for ten years (from 1992 to 2002) and we show results that use up to a quartic in time
because quartics appear to capture all of the smooth variation over time in enrollment.
This approach therefore assumes
E[²ist ¢ dlog(ust)j´s] = 0
which is implemented in a ﬁxed eﬀects 2SLS procedure which eliminates school ﬁxed
eﬀects.
Note that this approach is valid as long as the variation in enrollment does not trigger
a change in the number of classes from 2001/02 to 2002/03 since this would violate
monotonicity of the instrument. For this reason we only include schools where predicted
number of classes are the same in 2001/02 and 2002/03. Finally, to take into account any
remaining endogeneity – which would occur when parents transfer their children to other
schools in response to the class size their children are experiencing – we follow Hoxby and
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also carry out the analysis at the district level in order to cancel out within school district
transfers. Other sources of bias such as transfers to private schools or selective grade
retention or advancement are not present in Norway because of the neglible presence of
private schools and the absence of grade retention/advancement practices.
1.5.3 Variations of population variation
A number of authors have used approaches that build on or combine the methods dis-
cussed above. We will also present results based on these approaches and therefore
describe them.
Population variation and maximum class size rules In addition to exploiting population
variation while conditioning on number of classes, Hoxby (2000) also uses the population
variation that triggers changes in the number of classes (and therefore class size) because
of maximum class size rules. Hoxby identiﬁes all events where the number of classes
changed because of maximum class size rules. For all cases where the enrollment change
was not more than 20 percent, she then estimates a ﬁrst diﬀerenced version of equation
(1.1).
Small schools Urquiola (2006) focuses on small schools with only one predicted class
(per grade). The idea here is that the endogeneity of class size is less of a problem in small
rural schools since they are local monopolies and parents cannot enroll their children
elsewhere thereby ruling out between school sorting, in addition between class sorting is
not an issue since these small schools have only one class. As noted by Urquiola, class
size may still correlate with unobserved factors that aﬀect achievement since class size
depends on community size, fertility, etc. All class size variation is therefore generated
by diﬀerences in enrollment and this approach is like Hoxby’s, but does not control
for school ﬁxed eﬀects since it exploits cross sectional variation, moreover it does not
control for trends. The implementation is straightforward and amounts to estimating
equation 1.1 by OLS, where schools with more than one predicted class per grade are
excluded. Furthermore the sample is restricted to districts with only one school. This
strategy is suitable for the Norwegian context with rural settlement pattern and many
small schools.
Within school between grade comparison Wößmann and West (2006) use within school
and between grade variation to estimate class size eﬀects. By comparing adjacent grades
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they account for between school sorting since they eliminate school ﬁxed eﬀects (to the
extent to which they are uniform across grades). To eliminate within school sorting
problems, actual class size is instrumented with average class size at the grade level. The
reduced form estimates are therefore equivalent to the population variation approach of
Hoxby, but without correcting for a trend, and without discarding schools around the
kinks. We will implement a version of this approach where we exploit variation in
enrollment between cohorts in the same school instead of variation between grades.13
1.6 Results
Estimates of the class size eﬀects based on the diﬀerent approaches are presented in
Table 1.4.14 These results are all based on speciﬁcations with the full set of control
variables (e.g. the same control variables as those included in the OLS-regression). Less
elaborate speciﬁcations produce very similar results (and are available from the authors
upon request). Moreover, for students in combined schools we also know their class size
during grades 1 to 6, assuming that students do not switch between combined schools
and separate schools. We have also conducted analyses using average class size during
the six years in primary school as a class size measure. As mentioned above, we have
chosen not to present these results since the results are very similar to the results for
average class size in lower secondary schools.15
The ﬁrst thing to note in Table 1.4 is that only one out of the twelve eﬀect estimates
presented in the table has the expected negative sign and that none of the eﬀect estimates
is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. With the true eﬀect equal to zero, the likelihood of
having 11 out of 12 estimates of the same sign is only 0.3%, thereby suggesting that the
class size eﬀect in Norwegian lower secondary schools is actually positive. Almost all
eﬀects are estimated quite precisely, so that substantial negative eﬀects of class size of
achievement can be ruled out with high probability. Below each eﬀect estimate we report
in square brackets the largest (most negative) eﬀect that falls in the 95% conﬁdence
13The reason for this deviation of Wößmann and West’s approach is that we only have outcomes
measured in the ﬁnal grade of lower secondary school whereas they have outcome data for two
adjacent grades. Hence, their possible bias due to diﬀerences between grades is replaced by a
possible bias due to diﬀerences across cohorts.
14The ﬁrst stages are always quite strong, with values from F-tests for signiﬁcance of the instrument
at least equal to 102.8.
15There may be some concern that the results for average class size in lower secondary schools pick
up eﬀects of average class size in primary schools. This is muted, however, by the fact that the
maximum class size rule in primary schools is diﬀerent from that in lower secondary schools (28
versus 30).
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interval (point estimate - 1.96*s.e.). In four cases, this maximum eﬀect is in the range
of 1 and 2 percent of a standard deviation for a one student reduction in class size. The
other eight estimates imply maximum eﬀects of 1 percent of a standard deviation or less.
The results in Table 1.4 reveal no clear pattern in the estimated eﬀect sizes across
the diﬀerent methods, apart from the fact that those that exploit population variation
including a trend (rows 3 and 4) have substantially larger standard errors than the other
methods, especially when applied to math achievement.
Some have argued that maximum class size rules may be inappropriate to estimate
the impact of class size on achievement because of potential input substitution around
the discontinuities. To investigate whether this is an issue in Norway we replaced our
class size measure by teacher hours per student (which is a common measure of resource
use in Norway, e.g. Hægeland et al. (2005, 2007)). The correlation between teacher
hours per pupil and our class size measure is 0.8.
Table 1.5 shows results from 2SLS estimations based on maximum class size rules as in
Table 1.4. If input substitution is complete our instrument would not aﬀect teacher hours
per pupil. As can be seen from Table 1.5, when predicted class size increases by one,
teacher hours per pupil decrease by 0.67. Around the discontinuity the coeﬃcient equals
to -0.41 but is still highly signiﬁcant. Although there might be some input substitution,
it is clear from these results that it is far from being complete. Moreover, there remains
a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in terms of teacher hours around the discontinuities.
The two bottom panels of Table 1.5 report impact estimates of teacher hours on
mathematics and language achievement. The eﬀects are in line with those in Table 1.4;
they are highly insigniﬁcant and tend to have the wrong sign.
1.7 Heterogeneous class size eﬀects
In this section we investigate whether the zero class size eﬀect reported in the previous
section, hides positive eﬀects of class size reduction for speciﬁc sub-groups. The reason
to explore this is that various studies report that eﬀects of class size reduction are more
pronounced for disadvantaged groups (Angrist and Lavy, 1999; Krueger, 1999) or depend
on teacher characteristics (Wößmann and West, 2006).
Table 1.6 presents results for speciﬁc groups based on the method that exploits max-
imum class size rules (for the full sample and around kinks) and on the method that
exploits population variation (and includes a trend). The ﬁrst sub-group is that of pupils
with low educated mothers (less than 10 years of education). Results from the maximum
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Table 1.5 – The impact of School Resources (Teacher
Hours/Pupil) on Achievement - 2SLS estimates based
on maximum class size rules
All DS§5
First Stage1
Predicted Class size ¡0:671 ¡0:413
(0:080)¤¤¤ (0:106)¤¤¤
N (NS) 114,665 (994) 34,669 (377)
Second Stage - Mathematics
Teacher Hours/Pupil 0:005 ¡0:012
(0:006) (0:020)
N (NS) 37,828 (752) 10,701 (189)
Second Stage - Language
Teacher Hours/Pupil ¡0:002 ¡0:010
(0:003) (0:007)
N (NS) 76,837 (953) 23,968 (279)
1The ﬁrst stage results shown here are based on the full sample
(i.e. both math and language scores).
class size rule using the full sample suggests that there is a signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect
of class size on achievement in both language and math. The results obtained from the
discontinuity sample and from the population variation method do, however, not point
in the same direction. The evidence in favor of beneﬁcial class size eﬀects for students
with low educated mothers is therefore limited.
As a second subgroup we consider children from immigrant families (their share in the
population is only 5 percent). For this group we ﬁnd no consistent pattern; one of the
estimates is positive and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 5%-level. The ﬁve other
estimates do, however, not conﬁrm this result (none signiﬁcant and one with a negative
sign).
The results for girls - reported in the third block - are all very small, and do not diﬀer
substantially or signiﬁcantly from the results from girls and boys together. The fourth
part of the table presents results for pupils in the lowest quartile of the age distribution.
Here again, the emerging pattern is far from consistent. For math achievement, the
maximum class size rule applied to the full sample results in a signiﬁcantly negative
estimate, whereas the approach based on population variation shows the reverse (with
a very large point estimate).
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The ﬁnal two parts of the table present eﬀects for pupils in schools of which the
teaching staﬀ belongs to the lowest quartile in terms of education level or in terms of
experience. Again the diﬀerent methods fail to reveal a consistent pattern. Applying
the maximum class size rule on the full sample indicates a negative eﬀect of class size
on language achievement for pupils in schools with low educated teachers. This result
concurs with the hypothesis advanced by Wößmann and West (2006). This ﬁnding is,
however, not conﬁrmed by the other results in this block; three of the ﬁve other estimates
even have the opposite sign.
We are inclined to conclude that there is only rather weak evidence for heterogeneous
class size eﬀects. If anything, it are pupils from low educated families and pupils in
schools with low educated teachers that beneﬁt the most from a reduction in class size.
1.8 Conclusion
Based on estimation results that exploit arguably exogenous variation in class size, we
ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀect of class size during lower secondary school on achievement in
grade 9 in Norway. We can even exclude eﬀects as small as 1.5 percent of a standard
deviation for a one student reduction in average class size during three years.
Eﬀects are rather similar for diﬀerent social backgrounds groups and for schools with
diﬀerent teaching staﬀs. There is only a rather weak indication that students with low
educated mothers and students in schools with low educated teachers beneﬁt somewhat
from a reduction in class size.
Our ﬁndings contrast sharply with most of the recent studies that apply experimental
and quasi-experimental methods to estimate the class size eﬀect. Interestingly, while we
applied the same identiﬁcation strategy as Angrist and Lavy did in their study for Israel
the ﬁndings are very diﬀerent. We interpret this as evidence that there is no such thing
as a universal class size eﬀect.
Potential explanations for the zero class size eﬀect in Norway are substitution of
parental inputs and uniform teaching styles. Substitution of parental inputs occurs if the
parents of pupils who are placed in small classes reduce their own inputs in the education
production function (cf. Todd and Wolpin 2003). Uniform teaching styles annihilate
potentially beneﬁcial class size eﬀects if teachers are unable to take advantage of the
extra time they could have per student. Although the fact that we ﬁnd some indication
that pupils of low educated teachers beneﬁt more from class size reduction than pupils
of high educated teachers, seems to contradict this explanation. Further research is
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required to diﬀerentiate between these various explanations. This is important because
the policy implications are quite diﬀerent. If the zero-eﬀects are due to substitution of
parental inputs there is not much hope that the policy eﬀects can be improved, although
the reduction of parental inputs should be included in a cost-beneﬁt analysis. If the zero-
eﬀects are due to uniformity in teaching styles, there remains scope for improvement by
teaching teachers to take advantage of smaller classes.
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2 Who beneﬁts from homework?
2.1 Introduction
The empirical literature on the impact of school inputs on educational performance
increasingly recognizes that such impacts cannot be well summarized by an average eﬀect.
The eﬀects of diﬀerent educational policies are very likely to vary across pupils from
diﬀerent family backgrounds because of substitution between the quality of the school
environment and the quality of the home environment. This explains why the eﬀects are
typically bigger for disadvantage children (e.g. Guryan, 2001; Lindahl, 2001; Card and
Payne, 2002; Papke, 2005). A good example is early schooling which is assumed to have
a beneﬁcial eﬀect on pupils from disadvantage backgrounds since learning is substituted
from the home environment to the class room at an early stage (see for example Leuven
et al., 2006).
The current paper takes a slightly diﬀerent approach and focus on complementarities
between school inputs and the quality of the home environment. It does so by considering
homework. Since homework takes learning out of the class room we expect pupils from
higher socioeconomic backgrounds to beneﬁt more from homework assignments.
Homework is commonly assigned to pupils in elementary education because it is be-
lieved to improve the performance. This belief is not conﬁrmed by the education litera-
ture. Cooper (1989) conducted a review of nearly 120 empirical studies concerning the
eﬀect of homework on pupil outcome, and concluded that for elementary school pupils
the eﬀect of homework on achievement is negligible, if it exists at all.1
Younger pupils, especially those in elementary education, have less well-developed
study habits (see for example Cooper, 2007). This suggests that they need parental help
in order to complete their homework assignments. Since parental input is not equally
distributed across pupils and is most likely a supplement to homework, children who are
1In the same study Cooper points out that the eﬀect of homework on achievement is grade dependent.
For high school students and also junior high school students homework has a positive eﬀect. Other
studies that ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of homework on student achievement in higher grades are; Betts
(1996); Aksoy and Link (1999); Eren and Hendersen (2006).
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most in need for extra work are the ones least likely to beneﬁt from it. Consequently,
the lack of a (clear) homogeneous eﬀect on pupil outcome may be due to that homework
exacerbate heterogeneous eﬀects (Baker, LeTendre and Akiba, 2005 pp. 132).
This aspect of homework has received surprisingly little attention in the empirical
literature. Using Dutch survey data on pupils and teachers in elementary school, this
paper is the ﬁrst study that empirically analyzes the heterogeneous eﬀects of homework.
Suspect variation in homework may arise because of several reasons and the primary
objective in the empirical analysis is to eliminate sources of bias that possibly contami-
nate our results. First of all, potential biases caused by unobserved school quality and
student selection are taken out by exploiting variation within schools. And in order to
distinguish the eﬀect of homework from unobserved teacher and pupil eﬀects, we proceed
with comparing within class diﬀerences in test scores in classes where everybody gets
homework to within class diﬀerences in test scores in classes where nobody gets home-
work. Thus the empirical strategy boils down to a diﬀerence in diﬀerence approach. The
advantage with this latter procedure is that confounding eﬀects of unobserved teacher
characteristics drop out as long as they are homogeneous within class. And since every-
body in the class either gets homework or does not get homework we can also rule out
within class correlations between homework and unobserved individual pupil eﬀects.
Our ﬁndings suggest that the test score gap is indeed larger in classes where everybody
gets homework than in classes where nobody gets homework. More precisely, we ﬁnd
that pupils belonging to the upper part of the socioeconomic status scale gain, whereas
pupils from the lowest part are unaﬀected.
If the intention with homework is to reinforce the children’s learning process at home
(and thereby beneﬁt from homework) and families are unequal to the task, the students
will not receive the same quality of education. Furthermore, it informs us about an early
source of inequality and should be important in a society who cares about inequality in
terms of extensive redistribution policy. The Netherlands is a country with a longstand-
ing tradition in attempting to promote equality of opportunity in education (Leuven et
al., 2007a)
The structure of the paper is as follows; Section 2.2 describes the data; in Section 2.3
we discuss complementarity between homework and the home environment; the empirical
approach is lined out in Section 2.4; Section 4.4 presents the results; and Section 2.6
concludes.
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2.2 Institutional settings and data
Elementary school in the Netherlands consists of eight grades. Children start school
when they are 4/5 years old and ﬁnish when they are 11/12 years old. Every teacher
covers all the subjects in the class. In the period under investigation, schools did not
have catchment areas and there was free school choice.
The empirical analysis in this paper build on data from the four last waves of the
Dutch PRIMA survey. This is a biannual survey which samples schools and contains
data/information on about 10 percent of the Dutch pupils in grade 2, 4, 6 and 8. The
ﬁrst survey took place in the school year 1993/1994 and the last wave used in this paper
is for the school year 2002/2003 (in total ﬁve school years). Several actors contributed
to the collection of the data: The pupil’s parents; the pupil’s teachers; the school’s
principals; and the pupils themselves.
In the Netherlands homework is typically assigned on language related tasks such as
reading and writing. To measure pupil outcome we therefore make use of test scores from
a language-test.2 This test is identical across schools and for all the four last PRIMA
waves and graded externally. We standardize it by grade and year with zero mean and
standard deviation equal to one in order to make it comparable.
Information on homework comes from the teacher questionnaires. The teachers in
grades 4, 6 and 8 were asked how often they assign homework and could choose between
four answers: i) hardly or never to anyone in my class; ii) only to the weak students in
class; iii) only to the good students in class; and iv) to everybody in my class.
An overview of the teachers’ homework practice in language are given in Table 2.1.
In grade 4, a majority of the teachers hardly ever give homework to anyone in the class,
whereas in grade 8 a majority of the teachers give homework to the whole class. In both
grade 4 and 6, a substantial amount of teachers report that they give homework to only
the weak pupils in their class. Basically nobody gives homework to the good pupils only.
The data contains no information on how often the pupils get homework, but based on
anecdotal evidence homework is typically given regularly, but not every day.
In the empirical analysis, we compare classes that get homework to classes that do
not get homework. This involves that we exclude classes where only weak or good pupils
get homework. This amounts to 1,677 classes and 31,572 pupils and does not lead to
2The test was taken halfway during the school years. There are some small diﬀerences regarding who
was the responsible staﬀ in the class room when the test was taken. In the second wave the test was
monitored by an external examiner, while in the three reminding waves the teacher of the class was
in charge during the test. Year dummies are added in the regression analysis.
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Table 2.1 – Homework: Summary statis-
tics, the teacher’s homework practice in lan-
guage.
Grade
4 6 8
Hardly or never 1,222 926 353
Weak students only 767 659 232
Good students only 3 5 11
Everybody 527 813 1,698
major changes in the sample (we exclude row two and three in Table 2.1).
From the parent questionnaires we have information on the pupil’s age, gender, educa-
tion levels of parents and an indicator variable which equals one if the pupil comes from
non-Western migrant backgrounds.3 Parent’s education level is divided into primary edu-
cation, lower vocational, upper secondary/intermediate vocational and university/higher
vocational. We also control for some class level characteristics such as the teacher’s expe-
rience, gender and log of class size. These variables come from the teacher questionnaires.
Since each teacher teaches all the subjects in the class, the observation unit is the same
for teachers and classes. For simplicity reasons, the term “class characteristics” therefore
denotes both characteristics with the class and the teacher in the remainder of the paper.
Table 2.2 gives a descriptive overview over the explanatory variables used in the em-
pirical analysis. About half of the pupils are girls, the average age is 10 years and 24
percent come from a non-Western migrant background. Furthermore, 18 (14) percent
of the mothers (fathers) have primary education, 32 (32) percent have lower vocational,
30 (24) percent have upper secondary/intermediate vocational and 12 (16) percent have
higher vocational/university. Concerning the class characteristics, the average teacher
has 18.4 years with experience and teaches a class consisting of 23 pupils. 54 percent of
the teachers are females.
Homework is not distributed randomly in the population. This is illustrated by Ta-
ble 2.3 which presents OLS estimates obtained from regressing the indicator variable
for homework on observed pupil and class characteristics. The probability of getting
homework is typically higher for older pupils and pupils from non-Western migrant
backgrounds. With respect to parental education, pupils whose mother’s education is
3This variable is derived from the funding scheme for Dutch primary schools that gives students with
an ethnic minority background a weight equal to 1.9.
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Table 2.2 – Sample summary statistics
Mean s.d.
Individual Characteristics (N = 96,723)
Girl 0.47 0.50
Boy 0.47 0.50
Age 10.02 1.80
Non-Western migrant background 0.24 0.43
Mother’s education
- Primary 0.18 0.38
- Lower vocational 0.32 0.47
- Upper secondary/inetermediate vocational 0.30 0.46
- University/higher vocational (higher education) 0.12 0.33
- Missing 0.08 0.27
Father’s education
- Primary 0.14 0.35
- Lower vocational 0.32 0.47
- Upper secondary/intermediate vocational 0.24 0.43
- University/higher vocational (higher education) 0.16 0.36
- Missing 0.14 0.35
Class Characteristics (N = 5,539)
Class size 23.10 5.90
Teacher’s experience 18.40 10.60
Female teacher 0.54 0.50
Missing information: student’s gender (5.42%); student’s age (1.10%);
female teacher (1.03%); class size (0.58%); teacher experience (0.31%)
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higher than or equal to upper secondary are less likely to get homework than pupils with
a lower vocational educated mother. And pupils with a primary (upper secondary) edu-
cated father are more (less) likely to get homework than pupils with a lower vocational
educated father. The chances for homework assignments are also higher if the teacher is
a woman. These ﬁndings indicate that homework is strongly correlated with observed
characteristic. Moreover, they illustrate that there is a remedial aspect connected to
giving homework in the sense that it is the weakest pupils who get homework. Hence
potential endogeneity problems must be addressed.4
2.3 Complementarity between homework and home environment
As mentioned above, some home environments may be more conductive to learning than
others, allowing heterogeneous eﬀects of homework to arise. It is therefore interesting
to shed some more light on the relationship between parental help with homework and
parental background. The ﬁrst wave of the PRIMA survey asked the parents of pupils
in grade 4 how much they help their children with homework (conditional on that the
children get homework). We have separate information on mothers and fathers, and
the frequency of parental help with homework is divided into three categories; “almost
never”; “sometimes”; and “often”. A descriptive overview over these answers are found
in Table 2.4. More mothers than fathers “often” assist with homework, whereas more
fathers than mothers “almost never” assist with homework. In order to check whether
paternal help with homework is a supplement to maternal help with homework and vice
versa, we have also cross tabulated maternal and paternal help. What is remarkable is
that in 77 percent of the cases where the mother answers that she almost never helps
with homework, also the father from the same household answers that he almost never
helps with homework. This really indicate that some children do not get help with
homework from neither parent. The next question we then should ask ourselves is why
this is the case? Is it due to that these children are not in need for assistance, or is it
because help with homework is totally lacking in some home environments?
To see which parents give help with homework, Table 2.5 proceeds with presenting the
marginal eﬀects obtained from regressing the frequency of maternal help with homework
on parental background using a multinomial regression model. “Often” serves as the
reference category.5 This table shows that parental help with homework is strongly
4The results are unaltered if we apply a binomial model.
5If maternal help in Table 2.5 is substituted with paternal help the pattern remains unchanged, but
the correlations are a bit less precisely estimated.
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Table 2.3 – The determinants for assigning homework
(1)
Individual characteristics
Girl 0:0014
(0:0030)
Age 0:0072
(0:0030)¤¤
Non-Western migrant 0:0883
(0:0095)¤¤¤
Mother’s education (ref = Low. Voc.)
- Primary ¡0:0009
(0:0077)
- Upper secondary ¡0:0116
(0:0053)¤¤
- Higher education ¡0:0300
(0:0075)¤¤¤
Father’s education (ref = Low. Voc.)
- Primary 0:0178
(0:0080)¤¤
- Upper secondary ¡0:0149
(0:0052)¤¤¤
- Higher education ¡0:0085
(0:0076)
Class characteristics
Log of class size ¡0:0229
(0:0244)
Teacher’s experience ¡0:0005
(0:0006)
Female teacher 0:0320
(0:0142)¤¤
N 96,723
Note: Reported estimates are from linear probability
models where the dependent variable is a dummy vari-
able which equals 1 if the class gets homework and 0 if the
class does not get homework, unit of observation is the
individual student. Standard errors are heteroscedastic
robust and corrected for class level clustering. Included
are also a constant term, year dummies, grade dummies,
dummy variables for missing information on gender, age
and parental education, missing information on class size,
teacher’s gender and experience. *, ** and *** denote
statistical signiﬁcance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level
respectively.
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Table 2.4 – Parental help with homework
Mother Father
Almost never 8.7% 20.5%
Sometimes 44.2% 58.1%
Often 47.1% 21.4%
Note: 5,744 observations on mater-
nal help with homework and 4,496
observations on paternal help with
homework.
related to parental education and ethnic background. First, conditional on the education
level, the probability that a mother with a non-Western migrant background “almost
never” help with homework is 14 percent. And second, a pupil with a primary educated
mother is 6 percent more likely to “almost never” get help with homework compared to
a pupil with a lower vocational educated mother. Furthermore, if the mother’s highest
level of obtained education is primary school, the chances are also higher that she only
sometimes help with homework than a mother whose education is lower vocational.
Note that a higher educated educated mother is more likely to “almost never” assist
with homework than a lower vocational educated mothers. This could be due to time
constraint or because the children of these mothers need less help. Finally, girls get less
help than boys.6
This analysis already illustrates that children from more disadvantaged backgrounds
receive less help with their homework assignments. It implicitly assumes that the quality
of the parental inputs is the same across groups. It seems however very likely that the
unobserved quality of parental input correlates positively with the amount of human
capital they posses. This suggests that, even keeping constant the time parents spend
on homework with their children, those with less able parents learn less from homework.
An example in place are children from ethnic minority families where the parents have
limited Dutch language skills.
One could think of many possible reasons why children from ethnic minority and
lower educated backgrounds get less help with homework. One explanation is parental
priority. Families from lower socioeconomic backgrounds may prioritize other activities
more than academic achievement. Another explanation is that some parents are not
6Note: Among mothers with primary level as highest level of obtained education, 60 percent are from
migrant families. Also note that 24% of the migrant mothers have missing information on highest
level of obtained education.
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Table 2.5 – Relation between parental help with
homework and parental background, estimates from
a multinomial logit model. “Often” is the reference
category.
Frequency of parental
help with homework
Almost never Sometimes
Girl 0:0155 0:0515
(0:0066)¤¤ (0:0132)¤¤¤
Non-Western migrant 0:1400 ¡0:0134
(0:0170)¤¤¤ 0:0218
Mother’s education (ref = Low. Voc.)
- Primary 0:0581 0:0427
(0:0159)¤¤¤ (0:0257)¤
- Upper secondary ¡0:0051 ¡0:0032
(0:0099) (0:0171)
- Higher education 0:0369 ¡0:0290
(0:0172)¤¤ (0:0245)
Note: N = 5744. p^1 = 0:0725 and p^2 = 0:4520. Reported
are marginal eﬀects. Standard errors in (...). *, ** and
*** denote statistical signiﬁcance at 10, 5 and 1 percent
level respectively. Included are also dummy variables for
missing information on gender and mother’s education.
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able to help their children, because of lack of the relevant skills. Summarized, these
ﬁndings indicate that the eﬀects of homework on achievement diﬀer across children from
diﬀerent socioeconomic backgrounds, and are the ﬁrst indications that heterogeneous
eﬀects of homework may exist. The next section is concerned with how to empirically
identify and test this.
2.4 Empirical approach
To estimate the impact of homework we start out with assuming that pupil i’s achieve-
ment (y) in class j and school s can be explained by the following education production
function:
yijs = x
0
i¯ + !
0
js'+ ±ihwj + "ijs (2.1)
where xi is a vector of observed attributes of the pupils and his parents; !j a vector of
observed class characteristics; and hwj is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if the
class receives homework and zero if the class does not get homework. The parameter of
interest is ±i, where subscript i indicates that the eﬀect of homework may diﬀer between
pupils as already discussed above.
The central problem we face when estimating equation (2.1) by Ordinary Least squares
(OLS) is that the estimate of the homework eﬀect may be contaminated by omitted vari-
ables such as the inﬂuence of unmeasured class and teacher characteristics; unobserved
school characteristics; as well as unobserved pupil and family characteristics. Conse-
quently, we must be careful with giving this estimate of homework a causal interpre-
tation. Note that the sign of the bias is not clear a priori. Good schools may give
homework to do even better, or bad schools may give homework to make up for the poor
environment. Similarly, poor teachers may use homework to compensate for the lack
of teaching skills, while good teachers may use it to achieve ambitious goals. Correla-
tion between homework and unobserved school and class characteristics may also arise
because of pupil sorting. How these correlations net out is unclear.
Since one of the potential sources of bias is unobserved school characteristics, we
include a school ﬁxed eﬀect, Ãs, to equation (2.1):
yijs = x
0
i¯ + !
0
js'+ ±ihwj + Ãs + uijs (2.2)
This identiﬁcation rests on schools where there is variation in homework practices be-
tween classes within grades (i. e., Ãs is actually a school-grade ﬁxed eﬀect). As a
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ﬁrst attempt to check whether heterogeneous eﬀects of homework exist we will estimate
equation (2.2) for diﬀerent sub samples of pupils stratiﬁed after mother’s education.7
Although ﬁxed eﬀects estimation improves on OLS, uijs may still contain unobserved
characteristics of the teachers and pupils, allowing within school diﬀerences in homework
assignment to correlate with diﬀerences in teacher quality and attributes of the pupils.
A standard way to solve this problem would be estimate a more elaborate ﬁxed eﬀects
model and to include a teacher ﬁxed eﬀect (µj) and a pupil ﬁxed eﬀect (Ái) and estimate
the following equation:
yijs = x
0
i¯ + !
0
js'+ ±ihwj + µj + Ái + Ãs + uijs (2.3)
Unfortunately we cannot estimate equation (2.3) using our data. The remainder of
this section is therefore concerned with how to purge our homework estimates from the
confounding eﬀects of these unobserved characteristics.
We will do so by looking at within class diﬀerences in test scores. The advantage of
this procedure is that any unobserved teacher ﬁxed eﬀect, µj, will drop out as long as
it is homogeneous across pupils within class. Moreover, since everybody in the class
either gets homework or does not we also have that at the class level homework does not
correlate with unobserved pupil ability, i.e. E[Áijhwj] = 0. Under these assumptions we
will estimate the eﬀect of homework on within class diﬀerences in test scores using the
reduced form equation given by equation (2.4).
ineq(yi)js = ½hwj + Ãs + ºjs (2.4)
where as a measure on ineq(yi)j we use variance of the test scores as well as diﬀerences
between various percentiles within the class. To simplify the analyses we base our in-
equality measures on residuals from OLS regressions that correct test scores for observed
student and class characteristics. A descriptive overview of the inequality measures are
given in Appendix Table 2.10.
Since we still condition on the school-grade ﬁxed eﬀect, Ãs, this approach boils down
to a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence strategy. If the impact of homework on achievement is
homogenous its eﬀect on inequaltiy will be zero. The hypothesis we want to investigate
is whether ½ > 0, that inequalities in classes where everybody gets homework is larger
7Since a crucial part of the identiﬁcation strategy involves exploiting variation in homework practices
across class rooms within schools and grades, a further restrictions in the sample is required. More
precisely, we need to eliminate schools with no variation in homework within grades and schools. A
descriptive overview over this reduced sample is shown in Appendix Table 2.9.
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than inequalities in classes where nobody gets homework.
Although the assumptions made here are restrictive they improve substantially on
the (individual) level equations. Another advantage of this approach is that possible
problems connected to reverse causality weaken. When analyzing within class diﬀerences
in test scores, reverse causality is only a problem if teachers respond to large inequalities
by giving homework to the whole class. If the aim of homework is to smooth out
inequalities, we would think that the rational way of reacting is to give homework to
only the weak pupils in the class.8
2.5 Results
Although homework is not randomly assigned across pupils, it is still of interest to look
at the relation between homework and pupil achievement estimated with a simple OLS.
This is reported in Table 2.6. In column (1) which is obtained from a speciﬁcation
without covariates, the homework estimate is negative and highly signiﬁcant. More
precisely it indicates that pupils who get homework perform 12 percent of a standard
deviation worse on average than pupils who do not get homework. As already discussed
above, this eﬀect cannot be given a causal interpretation since homework tends to be
given to the weakest pupils. Column (2) conﬁrms this. When controlling for individual
characteristics, the eﬀect decreases to 0.3 percent of a standard deviation and is clearly
insigniﬁcant. In column (3) where we also control for class characteristics the eﬀect
is further reduced to 0.02 percent of a standard deviation. Hence, this conﬁrms that
homework appears to be highly correlated with both individual and class characteristics,
and some more elaborated strategies are indeed essential in order to identify the eﬀects
of homework.
One such strategy is to compare pupils within schools and grades only. Table 2.7
presents result from estimating equation (2.2) with school-grade ﬁxed eﬀects. The left
panel (column 1 to 3) reports results from various speciﬁcations including all pupils,
whereas the right panel stratiﬁes pupils by mothers’ education and reports results from
the most elaborate speciﬁcation only.
The ﬁrst thing to note in Table 2.7 is that the point estimates of homework are
not sensitive to the inclusion of individual and class characteristics. This can be seen
in column (1) to (3). This suggests that homework is not correlated with (observed)
8Also note that ruling out reverse causality is a bigger problem if the dependent variable is the average
achievement level. A teacher may decide to give homework to the whole class in reaction to low
average achievement level in that class.
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Table 2.6 – The relation between homework and achievement, OLS
(1) (2) (3)
Homework ¡0:1175 ¡0:0031 ¡0:0002
(0:0163)¤¤¤ (0:0114) (0:0114)
Individual characteristics
Girl 0:0738 0:0738
(0:0061)¤¤¤ (0:0061)¤¤¤
Age ¡0:1669 ¡0:1663
(0:0053)¤¤¤ (0:0053)¤¤¤
Non-Western migrant ¡0:5344 ¡0:5223
(0:0114)¤¤¤ (0:0115)¤¤¤
Mother’s education (ref. = Low. Voc.)
- Primary ¡0:1339 ¡0:1303
(0:0117)¤¤¤ (0:0117)¤¤¤
- Upper secondary 0:2100 0:2083
(0:0085)¤¤¤ (0:0085)¤¤¤
- Higher educateion 0:3923 0:3911
(0:0127)¤¤¤ (0:0127)¤¤¤
Father’s education (ref. = Low. Voc.)
- Primary ¡0:0744 ¡0:0717
(0:0119)¤¤¤ (0:0119)¤¤¤
- Upper secondary 0:1431 0:1422
(0:0088)¤¤¤ (0:0088)¤¤¤
- Higher education 0:2981 0:2976
(0:0115)¤¤¤ (0:0115)¤¤¤
Class characteristics
Log of class size 0:0960
(0:0211)¤¤¤
Teacher’s experience 0:0028
(0:0005)¤¤¤
Female teacher ¡0:0139
(0:0111)
N 96,723 96,723 96,723
R-squared 0.0028 0.2022 0.2039
Note: The unit of observation is the individual student. Standard errors are
heteroscedastic robust and corrected for class level clustering. Included in all
speciﬁcations are a constant term, grade and year dummies. The speciﬁcations
which control for individual characteristics also include dummy variables for
missing information on gender, age and mother’s and father’s education. The
speciﬁcation(s) which control for class characteristics also include(s) dummy
variables for missing information on class size, teacher’s gender and experience.
*, ** and *** denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level
respectively.
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individual and class characteristics when comparing pupils within the same school and
grade. Moreover, the eﬀect of homework on pupil achievement is positive, but only
signiﬁcant at the eighteen percent level. Turning to the right panel, column (4) shows
that the point estimate is negative for pupils with a primary educated mother, but the
point estimate is close to zero and insigniﬁcant. On the other hand, homework appears
to have a positive eﬀect on the achievement for pupils whose mothers have at least lower
vocational (column 5). The eﬀect is also signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level. If we were to
give the latter result credence we would say that homework increases pupil achievement
with 7 percent of a standard deviation.9
Summarized, when ruling out suspect variation across schools and grades, the ﬁnd-
ings suggest that homework has a positive eﬀect on average pupil achievement, but
the estimates lack precision. However, when stratifying on mother’s education the ef-
fect strengthens for pupils from the upper part of the socioeconomic status scale, but
disappears for pupils from the lowest part of the socioeconomic status scale.
To the extent that measurable characteristics of the teachers explain little of the true
variation in teacher quality, and that most of the variation in teacher quality occurs
within schools (Rivkin et al., 2005), we must be careful with ruling out correlations
between homework and unobserved teacher attributes. The next section is concerned
with whether this pattern remains when analyzing the eﬀect of homework on within
class diﬀerences in test scores.
2.5.1 The eﬀect of homework on within class diﬀerences
Table 2.8 presents results from estimating equation (2.4) which compares within class
diﬀerences in test scores across class rooms within the same school and grade. Each
row represents one regression. Out of totally six point estimates, four are signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero at the ﬁve and ten percent level. Thus the general picture is that
homework increases the within class diﬀerences in the test scores.
In the upper panel of the table, both the variance as well as the distances between
the 85th and the 15th and the 75th and the 25th percentiles are signiﬁcantly larger in
homework-classes than in non-homework classes. The point estimates being respectively
0.05 (21 percent of a standard deviation), 0.17 (15 percent of a standard deviation) and
0.09 (20 percent of a standard deviation). The distance between the 95th and the 5th
9The argument for separately looking at students from primary educated mothers versus the remaining
students is because of the ﬁndings in section 2.3 that primary educated mothers help their children
less with homework than the others.
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Table 2.7 – The eﬀect of homework on student achievement, ﬁxed
eﬀect estimates
Education Mother
Primary > Primary
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Homework 0.0450 0.0471 0.0521 -0.0104 0.0723
(0.0416) (0.0389) (0.0385) (0.0625) (0.0404)*
Controls
- Individual No Yes Yes Yes Yes
- Class No No Yes Yes Yes
N 4,316 4,316 4,316 967 3,349
R-squared 0.0006 0.0951 0.0960 0.0533 0.0601
Note: See Table 2.6
percentile is also positive, but not signiﬁcant.
Turning to the lowest panel, the results in Table 2.8 conﬁrm the ﬁndings in Table 2.7 to
a large degree. Giving homework to the whole class has a positive and signiﬁcant impact
on the deviation between the 85th percentile and the median, whereas the distance
between the median and the 15th percentile seems to be the same in homework and
non-homework classes. Thus pupils from the upper part of the distribution signiﬁcantly
beneﬁt from homework.
A non-parametric way of analyzing the same problem, is to divide the pupils into two
groups depending on whether they are in homework classes or not, and plot the density
distribution of test score separately for these two groups. This is illustrated in Figure
2.1. Since the relevant approach is a within school within grade comparison, the test
scores are standardized by grade, school and year. The lower part of the distribution
coincide in homework and non-homework classes indicating that the weakest pupils are
unaﬀected by homework. Concerning the the upper part of the distribution, it is skewed
to the right in classes where pupils gets homework, and thereby conﬁrming that it is the
better pupils who are the ones who beneﬁt from homework.
2.6 Concluding remarks and policy implications
Using Dutch data on children and their teachers in elementary school this papers shows
that within class diﬀerences in test scores are larger in classes where everybody gets
homework than in classes where nobody gets homework. More precisely we ﬁnd that
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Table 2.8 – The eﬀect of homework on
spread in test score, ﬁxed eﬀect estimates
Dependent variable Eﬀect s.e.
Variance 0:0485 (0:0271)¤
Percentile ranges
75th - 25th 0:0860 (0:0411)¤¤
85th - 15th 0:1665 (0:0643)¤¤
95th - 5th 0:1292 (0:1023)
85th - 50th 0:1392 (0:0514)¤¤
50th - 15th 0:0273 (0:0397)
N 258
Note: The unit of observation is the class. In-
cluded are also a constant term and year dum-
mies. The standard errors are robust and cor-
rected for grade level clustering. *, ** and ***
denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 10, 5 and 1
percent level respectively.
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Figure 2.1 – The distribution of test scores in homework classes and non-homework
classes
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pupils in the upper part of the socioeconomic statues scale gain, whereas pupils in
the lowest part of the scale are unaﬀected. Under the assumption that unobserved
teacher attributes only aﬀect average achievement, we argue that we manage to separate
the eﬀect of homework from unobserved class and teacher characteristics. Moreover,
potential biases arising from unobserved school quality and pupil selection are accounted
form by exploiting variation within schools.
These ﬁndings are important because they informs us about an early source of inequal-
ity, and should be of interest for both policy makers and teachers and school principals.
It is well documented that pupils from disadvantage backgrounds fall behind at a very
early age (even before they start school), and many education subsidies are motivated
as an attempt to reduce these inequalities. It is therefore both essential and necessary
to learn about potential sources that generate or increase (already existing) inequalities.
If giving homework to children in elementary school contributes to growing inequalities
at an early stage in the schooling career, we might want to reconsider current homework
practices. One solution is the introduction of homework-help during or after school time
for those pupils who do not get suﬃcient help at home. Another solution is that par-
ents with less education should receive guidance from the school in order to assist their
children in productive ways (Balli, Demo and Wedman 1998).
59
Who beneﬁts from homework?
A. Appendix
Table 2.9 – Sample summary statistics, reduced sample
Mean s.d.
Individual Characteristics (N = 4,316)
Girl 0.47 0.50
Boy 0.47 0.50
Age 9.53 1.70
Non-Western migrant background 0.31 0.46
Mother’s education
- Primary 0.22 0.42
- Lower vocational 0.31 0.46
- Upper secondary/intermediate vocational 0.29 0.45
- University/higher vocational (higher education) 0.12 0.33
- Missing 0.06 0.24
Father’s education
- Primary 0.17 0.38
- Lower vocational 0.30 0.46
- Upper secondary/intermediate vocational 0.23 0.42
- University/higher vocational (higher education) 0.16 0.36
- Missing 0.15 0.35
Class Characteristics (N = 258)
Class size 22.45 5.35
Teacher’s experience 16.80 10.80
Female teacher 0.60 0.49
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Table 2.10 – Descriptive statistics,
diﬀerent inequality measures on
class level
Mean s.d.
Variance 0.828 0.229
Percentile Ranges
75th - 25th 1.039 0.354
85th - 15th 1.650 0.560
95th - 5th 2.696 0.831
85th - 50th 0.871 0.428
50th - 15th 0.778 0.346
N 258
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3 The eﬀect of workplace
characteristics on teacher sickness
absenteeism
3.1 Introduction
Sickness absenteeism is expensive for several reasons. The society must pay sickness ben-
eﬁts and replacement; the sick individuals themselves loose work experience and acquired
human capital; and having sick colleagues may be destructive for the overall moral on
the workplace. In the school sector, sickness absenteeism may have an additional cost.
Teacher absenteeism may be costly to the extent that the pupils learn less during their
absence. This hypothesis is supported by Miller, Murname and Willett (2006) who ﬁnd
evidence that teacher absenteeism has a negative impact on the mathematics achieve-
ment of elementary school students in the Ormondale School district in the US. Potential
channels this may work through are; i) ordinary teachers are substituted by less qualiﬁed
replacement teachers; ii) the change of the teacher itself may have a disruptive eﬀect on
the student’s learning environment; iii) in the worse scenario classes may be canceled
when a replacement teacher cannot be found.
A common agreement in the literature is that teacher quality is a crucial input in
explaining student outcome, but that observed measures on teacher quality like educa-
tion and experience turn out to explain very little of the variation in student outcome
(see Hanushek, 2002). It is therefore surprising that teacher absenteeism has not been
devoted more space. There is however a small empirical literature showing that diﬀer-
ent sick-leave policies and ﬁnancial incentives may be eﬀective devices to lower teacher
absenteeism. These studies are typically older and based on US data (Winkler, 1980,
Jacobsen, 1989 and Ehrenberg et al., 1991).1
1The literature on the eﬀect of ﬁnancial incentives on sickness absenteeism in other sectors is more
elaborated. See for instance Johansson and Palme (2005) and references therein.
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One may argue that ﬁnancial incentives are implemented in order to reduce absen-
teeism caused by abuse of sick-leave privileges by healthy employees. It is however
diﬃcult to predict whether this type of absenteeism is due to pure shirking only, or
whether it also occurs because some teachers value their health over a raise in pecuniary
and non-pecuniary rewards. One example in place is: to obtain goodwill from the princi-
pal, teachers that are marginally sick may show up on their work. Both Winkler (1980)
and Jacobsen (1989) look at short term eﬀects only. In the long run, ﬁnancial incentives
may have weaker eﬀects simply because marginally sick teachers cannot continue to yield
eﬀort in order to obtain “goodwill”. If that is the case other types of policy devices may
have the potential to be equally good or even more successful. It is however important
to point out that the optimal sick leave policy may be a combination of ﬁnancial incen-
tives and money spent on preventive systems. On the other hand, deriving this optimal
strategy is diﬃcult since it requires information on shirking behavior versus involuntary
absenteeism. Notwithstanding, in order to get closer to an eﬃcient policy device, further
knowledge of sources that inﬂuence absenteeism are essential.
A couple of studies focus on diﬀerent factors that can explain variation in teacher
absenteeism. The ﬁrst one is Leuven (2006) who investigates the eﬀects on teacher
absenteeism of a Dutch policy that allows employees older than 52 to reduce their working
hours by 10 percent at the cost of a 3.5 percent reduction in salary. The aim of this
policy is to lower absenteeism among older workers in the Netherlands through subsidized
work time reduction. Exploiting longitudinal micro data on all teachers in primary
and secondary education in the Netherlands, he ﬁnds that male teachers lower their
absenteeism in response to this policy. Bradley et al. (2007) analyze so-called social
multiplier eﬀects (Manski, 1993). More precisely they investigate whether absenteeism
has spillover eﬀects on other teachers absenteeism. Using a database of matched teachers
and schools obtained from the Queensland Government of Australia they ﬁnd evidence
that teachers absenteeism depends on the absenteeism of their co-workers.
Another interesting result in both Leuven (2006) and Bradley et al. (2007) is that
teachers on temporary contracts have lower absenteeism rates than teachers on per-
manent contracts (see also Ichino and Riphahn, 2005). This suggest that less certain
employment contracts may have a disciplinary eﬀect in the sense that low sick rate im-
proves the chances of renewed contract and permanent position. These ﬁndings are in
line with the so-called shirking theory, that says that workers will shirk less and work
harder when for instance the punishment is hardened (Barmby et al., 1994; Shapiro, and
Stiglitz, 1984).
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Using longitudinal register data on teacher absenteeism linked to school (workplace)
as well as individual teacher characteristics, the current paper’s contribution to the liter-
ature is to analyze the eﬀect of workplace characteristics on teacher sickness absenteeism.
These characteristics are also of interest because they may signal that some teachers are
put under higher working pressure. For instance, teachers facing high pupil teacher ra-
tios may have a more tiresome work day than teachers facing lower pupil teacher ratios.
Similarly, teachers working in schools with many disadvantage students may be more
often confronted with stressful situations. Teachers’ working hours and contract type
are also considered in the model because the literature has found these two variables to
be important determinants for teacher absenteeism (Leuven, 2006; Bradley, 2007).2
The literature concerning absenteeism in other sectors have found working conditions
to be important predictors for absenteeism (e.g. Hemningway et al., 1997; Brown et
al., 1999; Ose, 2004). Yet, no earlier studies have particularly looked at how teacher
absenteeism relates to workplace characteristics.
To identify the eﬀects we exploit intertemporal variation within teachers who do not
move to another schools. In addition to controlling for variation across teachers, this
strategy also rules out that the results are driven by teachers who change schools. The
results will be reported jointly and separately for male and female teachers which is a
common practice in the sickness absenteeism literature. Moreover, we also stratify on
the teacher’s age.
The structure of the paper is as follows; section 2 describes the institutional settings;
section 3 presents the data; section 4 outlines the empirical approach; the results are
presented in section 5; we perform some robustness checks in section 6; and ﬁnally section
7 concludes.
3.2 Institutional settings
The Norwegian Public Service Pension Fund (“Statens Pensjonkasse”) guarantees teach-
ers 100 percent (monetary) replacement from the ﬁrst day of incapacity up to one year
(“sickness beneﬁt year”). The ﬁrst 16 days of the absence period is paid by the employer,
which for the teachers is the municipality. The Norwegian National Insurance company
(“Folketrygden”) reimburses the remaining days (maximum 248 working days) up to an
2Analyzing social multiplier eﬀects as in Bradley (2007) are more complicated and is therefore not a
part of this analysis.
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Table 3.1 – Summary statistics: Teacher sickness absenteeism measured
in percent per teacher per year
Mean s.d. N obs N teachers
All teachers 5.99 14.38 258,903 84,001
Female teachers 6.74 15.03 178,859 58,991
Male teachers 4.31 12.65 80,044 25,010
Teachers younger than 50 (young) 5.28 12.92 172,570 60,828
Teachers older than 50 (old) 7.39 16.84 86,333 12,196
Note: The table shows statistics for the whole population covering the school
years 2000/2001 to 2004/2005.
upper limit of 6G’s.3 Average teacher salary in Norway is approximately close to this
cap. Employees are allowed to use self-certiﬁcation for the ﬁrst three days of absence,
but need a medical certiﬁcate for all absence exceeding three days.
After one year, the insured employee either goes back to work again or is transferred to
the rehabilitation scheme. Rehabilitation is the step before disability, and its intention
is to avoid inﬂow into disability, either in forms of physical treatment or vocational
occupational rehabilitation. The maximum length of stay on the rehabilitation scheme
is one year, and the monetary compensation payed by “Folketrygden” is about 67 percent.
Because the probability is low that they will go back to work again, old employees may
be transferred directly to the disability scheme at the end of the “sickness beneﬁt year”
if they do not go back to work again. This is common for employees beyond 60 years.
3.3 Data
Longitudinal register data on medical certiﬁcated sickness absenteeism from Statistics
Norway covering all teachers in Norwegian primary and lower secondary school from
2000/01 to 2004/05 (in total ﬁve school years) are linked to school (workplace) charac-
teristics from the Norwegian Ministry of Education as well as individual teacher char-
acteristics also from Statistics Norway. Since a medical certiﬁcate is necessary only for
absence longer than three days, we do not have information on absenteeism shorter than
3In the period under investigation 1G increased from 48 377 NOK in 2000 to 58 139 NOK in 2004. 1
Euro '8 NOK.
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Figure 3.1 – The relationship between teacher’s age and absenteeism
four days.
A few teachers are continuously sick for more than one year. They constitute a large
part of of the sickness absenteeism and may not be representative for the average teacher.
We therefore exclude them from the sample. Moreover, the national retirement age in
Norway is 67, thus teachers older than 67 years are dropped. In order to avoid mixing
sickness absenteeism with being on leave we also drop all teachers on leave.4 Because
of the rural settlement pattern in Norway, some very small schools exist. These schools
are neither representative and are therefore excluded in the analysis (more precisely we
exclude schools with less than 10 pupils).
3.3.1 Sickness absenteeism
For each teacher we know how many “day’s work” per school year she is supposed to
work according to the work-contract and how many of these “day’s work” she was absent.
The yearly average amount of medical certiﬁcated sickness absenteeism for the time
period under investigation is 6 percent which can be seen in the ﬁrst row of Table
3.1.5 A general ﬁnding in the sickness absenteeism literature is that females are more
4All female employees in Norway are entitled generous maternity leave. 3.6 percent of the female
teachers in our data that are not registered as being on leave have children younger than or equal
to 1 year. In order not to mix sickness absenteeism with being on maternity leave, these teachers
are dropped.
5Average number of “day’s work” and “day’s work lost due to medical certiﬁcated absenteeism” are
respectively 195 and 12 per year. Since we do not have data on short term absenteeism, the total
absenteeism exceeds 6 percent.
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Figure 3.2 – The distribution of average sickness absenteeism per teacher per year con-
ditional on that the teacher was absent (N = 105,322).
sick than males, and that absenteeism is increasing in age (e.g. Barmby et al., 2002).
Norwegian teachers are no exception. In Norway, average sickness absenteeism among
female teachers is about 2.5 percentage points higher than average sickness absenteeism
among male teachers. And teachers born before 1950 (50 years old in 2000) are on
average 2.1 percentage points more absent than teachers born after 1950. Figure 3.1
illustrates the relationship between age and sickness absenteeism separately for both
genders. For male teachers the relationship seems to be fairly linear until the age of 55,
whereas female teachers between 30 and 35 years are more absent than female teachers
between 40 and 45 years. A likely explanation for the latter pattern is the age of their
own children. Sickness absenteeism for both genders seem to increases rapidly from about
55 years and onwards. Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of teacher sickness absenteeism
conditional on that the teachers have been absent. This ﬁgure shows that a majority of
these teachers lose less than 20 percent “day’s work” due to medical reported sickness
absenteeism. Moreover, average absenteeism among teachers in this group is about 15
percent.
3.3.2 Workplace characteristics
As already mentioned, our key indicators for workplace pressure are the schools resource
use and student composition. Two measures on resource use are available; teachers
hours and teacher man-year per pupil (the number of working hours per week multiplied
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with the number of workweeks per year). Teacher hours measures how much resources
are allocated to teachers’ interaction with students, either in the class-room or as extra
education to speciﬁc students. It is not perfectly correlated with teacher man-year
because the work load varies between subjects and depends on the amount of non-
teaching tasks. Teachers hours is regarded as a very precise measure of the teacher
resource use in schools. The relationship between teacher hours per pupil and teacher
man-year per pupil is strong. The correlation coeﬃcient is equal to 0.85 and is also
illustrated in ﬁgure 1 in Falch et al. (2006). Both resource measures are also strongly
related to school size as further shown in Falch et al. (2006), thus it is important to
separately control for school size in the model. An alternative measure on the school’s
resource use would be class size. However, the maximum class rule terminated the school
year 2002/03. As a consequence data on the number of classes per grade stopped being
collected.
To measure the student composition in the school we include students with special
needs and minority students. These two variables are derived from calculating the frac-
tion of students within a school who are entitled to extra lessons or instructions with
education personnel and the fraction of students who are given extra lessons in Nor-
wegian. It is important to emphasize that conditional on schools’ resource use (which
also capture extra resources used on special education to both Norwegian students with
special needs and minority students), minority and disadvantage students are not con-
founded with extra money allocated to the school to compensate a unfavorable student
composition.
We argued above that a unfavorable student composition and a high pupil teacher
ratio are likely to be associated with a more stressful and tiresome work environment.
Accordingly we expect sickness absenteeism to raise if the percent of minority and special
need students increases and to decline of the school’s resource use increases.
Teachers in Norway usually start their teaching career on a temporary contract. A
permanent contract is obtained in subsequent year(s) depending on availability of vacant
positions and also teaching performance. The latter contract type involves that the
teacher is granted a job in the school district. And in accordance with previous ﬁndings
(Bradley et al., 2007; Leuven, 2006; Ichino and Riphahn, 2005) we expect absenteeism
to raise if a permanent work contract is given to the teacher. Being on temporary job
contract is assumed to have a disciplinary eﬀect because it is an element of uncertainty
connected to whether the contract is extended the next school year.
Concerning the teacher’s individual workload, the number of weekly work hours are
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regulated by the work contract. However no strict guidance is imposed, involving that
before the start of each school year the teachers can negotiate their own workload with
the principal to a certain degree. In line with the ﬁnding in Leuven (2006), decreased
number of work hours is predicted to lower absenteeism. A reduced work week involves
more leisure time which can be used on other recreational activities that are good for
the general well being.
3.3.3 Individual control variables
In addition to gender and age, it is a common practice in the absenteeism literature
to control for education and income (e.g. Røed and Fevang, 2006; Askildsen et al.,
2005; Leuven, 2006; Ose, 2004; Winkler, 1980).6 Askildsen et al. (2005) also control for
marital status and own children. They ﬁnd that absenteeism is higher for separated and
divorced employees, whereas no strong signiﬁcant eﬀects relating to the number of small
children are found. The latter variable is meant to capture that small children cannot
stay home alone when they are sick. The fact that it is insigniﬁcant may be due to that
their absenteeism data lack information on spells shorter than 14 days. Nevertheless, we
acknowledge that the family situation may be an important determinant for absenteeism
and control for both marital status, the age of own children (indicator variable that
equals one if the teacher has own children younger than 12 years) as well as number
of own children. Finally, to take into account that the relationship between age and
sickness absenteeism is non linear we choose to control for a quartic age function which
is assumed to capture all smooth variation.
3.3.4 Descriptive statistics
Table 3.2 provides descriptive statistics for all the explanatory variables used in this
paper covering the whole period under investigation. The average Norwegian teacher is
44 years old, has a workload of 90 percent and earns about 26 000 NOK per month. She
teaches in a school consisting of 284 pupils where 6 and 5 percent of the students are
minority or special need students. Average teacher hours per pupil and average teacher
man-year per pupil is 75 and 8.8. Furthermore, 70 percent of the teachers are females,
65 percent have a permanent work contract, less than 5 percent do not have suﬃcient
6Teachers salary is to a large extend centrally decided and equal across teachers who share the same
education and experience. Moreover, since it is a function of experience and education in a nonlinear
and interacting way its eﬀect is diﬃcult to interpret. From the school year 2001/02 some local
discretion in the teacher’s wage bargaining were also introduced.
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Table 3.2 – Summary statistics: Explanatory variables
Mean s.d.
workplace characteristics
Minority students (measured in percent) 5.91 10.17
Students with special needs (measured in percent) 4.57 3.85
Man-year per pupil 8.78 2.60
Teacher hours per pupil 75.04 20.15
School size (number of pupils) 283.73 142.64
Primary school 0.55 0.51
Lower secondary school 0.24 0.43
Combined school 0.21 0.41
Workload (measured in percent) 90.14 18.79
Contract type
.-Permanent position 0.65 0.48
- Temporary position 0.15 0.36
- Missing 0.20 0.40
individual control variables
Female 0.70 0.46
Male 0.30 0.46
Age (years) 44.80 11.04
Salary (NOK)/1000 25.96 3.61
Education
- Unqualiﬁed (<= 12 years) 0.04 0.19
- Bachelor degree (12+3/4 years) 0.92 0.29
- Master or PhD degree (12+5/6 -9/10 years) 0.04 0.20
Marital status
- Unmarried 0.24 0.43
- Married 0.64 0.48
- Widow/widower 0.01 0.12
- Divorced/separated 0.10 0.30
- Missing 0.01 0.04
Children
- Number of children children 1.86 1.19
- Child(ren) <= 12 year(s) 0.32 0.47
Note. Number of observations: 258,903. All the variables are reported
Oct. 1st every school year by the principal or other school leaders.
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education to be certiﬁed, 65 percent are married and have on average 1.9 children and 32
percent have own children younger than 12 years. 55 percent of the Norwegian teachers
work in pure primary schools (1-7 grade), 24 percent work in pure lower secondary
schools (8-10 grade), whereas the remaining 21 percent work in combined schools (1-10
grade).
3.4 Empirical approach
Regarding sickness absenteeism, many aspects are of interest. The current paper fo-
cuses on one of them; the amount of absenteeism and how it is aﬀected by observed
characteristics. This section is concerned with how to empirically estimate this.
Assume that the amount of sickness absenteeism of teacher i in school s and year t
(aist) is generated by the following equation:
aist = ®+ x
0
ist° + ´i + µs + ±t + uist (3.1)
where x0ist is a vector consisting of all observable attributes of the teachers and schools
presented in table 3.2. Clearly, a large part of the sickness variation is explained by the
teacher’s general health condition which is unobservable. Under the assumption that
the teacher’s health state is constant over the period under investigation, it is captured
by the teacher ﬁxed eﬀect, ´i. A school ﬁxed eﬀect µs is included to control for all other
unobserved attributes with the schools that potentially is correlated with the sickness
absenteeism, ±t are time indicator variables and uist is a random error term.7
In principle, all types of ﬁxed eﬀects can be handled by including indicator variables in
the model. This is however a high dimensionality problem given the size of our sample.
One way to handle this is to exploit that with ﬁxed individual eﬀects included, school
speciﬁc eﬀects are solely identiﬁed by teachers moving between diﬀerent schools during
the sample period. This implies that we escape possible biases caused by teacher move-
ments between schools if we treat a teacher who moves from one school to another as
two diﬀerent individuals. Technically this involves that each teacher-school combination
is given a unique identiﬁer. In the empirical implementation we then only use intertem-
poral variation within teacher-school matches to identify the eﬀects of observables on
absenteeism. This is equivalent to including a full set of individual and school eﬀects
and the interaction between these eﬀects (Falch and Strøm, 2005; see also Goux and
7The model in equation (3.1) is on reduced form since we do not know the accurate reason why the
teachers are absent. Any underlying structural model is therefore not formalized.
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Maurin, 1999). In addition to controlling for variation across teachers, this strategy also
rules out that the results are driven by teachers who change schools. The exact model
we estimate is give by equation (3.2).
aist = ®+ x
0
ist° + ´i ¢ µs + ±t + uist (3.2)
3.5 Results
This section presents results from estimating diﬀerent variations of equation (3.2). Be-
cause of the high correlation between the two variables that measure the school’s re-
source use, separate regressions are run for each of them, and only those which include
teacher hours per student are reported in full tables. The teacher man-year coeﬃcients
are reported in Table 3.5.8 In all the tables we only report the estimation results for
the workplace characteristics, while the eﬀects of the individual control variables are
reported in appendix Table 3.7 and 3.8.
To shed some light on how the amount of sickness absenteeism is related to observed
characteristics, we start out with presenting estimates based on a simple OLS regression.
The results are reported in column (1) of Table 3.3. Although it is diﬃcult to give
estimation results obtained from a cross sectional analysis causal interpretations, it is of
interest to compare these ﬁndings with the results obtained from the ﬁxed eﬀect analysis
(FE) where intertemporal variation within teachers who have not changed schools are
used to identify the eﬀects. The results obtained from the latter approach are reported
in column (2) of the same table.9
The OLS analysis produces a zero correlation between the school’s resource use and
teacher absenteeism, suggesting that the school’s resource use have no impact on absen-
teeism. It is diﬃcult to explain why this occurs, but it is important to point out that
schools in Norway diﬀer substantially in terms of size, location, student body and also
teaching staﬀ. Larger schools in big urban cities are typically faced with relatively few
resources per pupil, whereas small schools situated in remote areas have relatively more
resources per pupil.10
8In a “horse-race” competition between teacher man-year per student and teacher hours per student,
the latter is signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level (point estimate = 0.112), whereas the ﬁrst one is
clearly insigniﬁcant.
9Since many teachers have zero absenteeism, the arguably most correct model would be a Tobit
speciﬁcation. However, teachers who are non-absent over the whole sample period will drop out
from the ﬁxed eﬀect approach.
10Winkler (1980) also ﬁnd zero eﬀect of the pupil-teacher ratio on absenteeism
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Table 3.3 – The eﬀect of workplace characteristics on teacher
sickness absenteeism.
OLS FE
(1) (2)
Workplace characteristics
Teacher hours per pupil ¡0:0021 ¡0:0139
(0:0024) (0:0056)¤¤
Minority students 0:0148 ¡0:0184
(0:0039)¤¤¤ (0:0126)
Special need students 0:0280 0:0247
(0:0108)¤¤¤ (0:0178)
Pupil 0:0027 0:0097
(0:0010)¤¤¤ (0:0058)¤
Pupil2/1000 ¡0:0032 ¡0:0155
(0:0014)¤¤ (0:0067)¤¤
School type (ref = Primary)
- Lower secondary ¡0:4241
(0:0906)¤¤¤
- Combined ¡0:0510
(0:0943)
Workload ¡0:0198 0:2102
(0:0022)¤¤¤ (0:0058)¤¤¤
Permanent position 0:9187 0:9458
(0:0921)¤¤¤ (0:1781)¤¤¤
N observations 258,903 176,499
N teachers 84,001 44,988
Note: The dependent variable is teacher i’s sickness absenteeism
in year t measured in percent. Standard errors are heteroscedastic-
ity robust and corrected for individual level clustering. Year dum-
mies; dummy variables for missing information on the teacher’s
contract type, length of education and marital status are included.
*. ** and *** denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 10, 5 and 1 per-
cent level respectively
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However, when condition on ﬁxed eﬀects we ﬁnd evidence that increased use of re-
sources has a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on sickness absenteeism. More precisely, when
ruling out variation across teachers and schools we ﬁnd that sickness absenteeism de-
clines with 2 percent of a standard deviation if teacher hours per student increases with
one standard deviation. In terms of percentage points this eﬀect amounts to 0.3, and is
not negligible given that average sickness absenteeism is 6 percent. The eﬀect of teacher
man-year per pupil is similar and reported in column 1 of Table 3.5.
The relationships between sickness absenteeism and both variables that measure stu-
dent composition are positive and highly signiﬁcant in the OLS analysis. The point
estimates suggest that a one standard deviation increase in minority and special need
students will increase the amount of sickness absenteeism with 1 and 0.8 percent of a
standard deviation respectively. Although the eﬀects are rather small, they indicate that
teachers working in schools that face a large share of minority and special needs students
have more sick-leave. The literature looking at teacher quit behavior typically ﬁnd that
teacher mobility is strongly related to characteristics of the students (e.g. Hanushek et
al. 2004). The true eﬀect of student composition on sickness absenteeism is then overes-
timated if teachers with good health sort themselves to schools with few minority and
special needs students. With respect to minority students this seems to be conﬁrmed
in column (2). It is however somewhat puzzling that the eﬀect is negative and almost
signiﬁcant at the ten percent level. The point estimate of the special need students is
on the other hand fairly unchanged in the ﬁxed eﬀect speciﬁcation, but note that the
standard error has increased (t-value equals 1.4 in column 2).
Furthermore, absenteeism is highest in schools with 313 pupils which is slightly larger
than average school size. Teachers working in pure lower secondary schools are less
absent than teachers working in schools with students at the primary level only.
The predicted positive eﬀect on absenteeism of both workload and being on a perma-
nent contract may be underestimated in an OLS analysis if teachers with good health
more often ask for a higher workload and are more easily given a permanent position.
Regarding workload this seem to be the case. The correlation between workload and
sickness absenteeism is negative and signiﬁcant in the OLS analysis, but obtains the ex-
pected signiﬁcant positive sign in the ﬁxed eﬀect analysis. The latter implies that a ten
percentage point increase in workload will increase sickness absenteeism by 2 percentage
points. This corresponds to 14 percent of a standard deviation. The point estimate of
having a permanent position is similar in the OLS and ﬁxed eﬀect analysis. Teachers on
a permanent job contract are almost 1 percentage point (about 7 percent of a standard
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deviation) more absent per year than teachers who have a temporary position which is
consistent with earlier evidence and the shirking theory. It is however important to em-
phasize that being on a temporary contract may not be a “good” incentive if marginally
sick teachers force themselves to work to hard in fear of not getting the contract renewed
the next school year.
Although the ﬁxed eﬀect approach handles a large part of the potential selection bias, a
small route for bias in the ﬁxed eﬀect estimates may remain. Biases arise if workload and
contract type are correlated with unobserved changes in the teacher’s health condition
over time. However, since the most likely scenario is a positive correlation (higher
workload and permanent positions are given to teachers with improved health), the
potential unobserved time varying health eﬀect will indeed bias the ﬁxed eﬀect estimates
downwards, ceteris paribus.
The eﬀects of the remaining individual control variables that correspond to Table 3.3
are reported in appendix Table 3.7. As expected divorced teachers and teachers with
small children are more absent. Note also that married teachers seem to be more absent
than unmarried teachers. It is diﬃcult to interpret why the latter result is obtained, but
it may be due to that being married is correlated with other conditions that we do not
control for in this model. Moreover, increased salary seems to be negatively correlated
with absenteeism (both in the OLS and FE speciﬁcation), but as already emphasized
this coeﬃcient may also capture omitted variables (see footnote 6).11
3.5.1 Gender diﬀerences
Since female employees turn out to have a higher sickness absenteeism than male em-
ployees, a common practice in the absenteeism literature is to separately look at at the
genders (e.g. Johansson and Palme, 2005; Leuven, 2006; Askildsen et al., 2005). We
follow this tradition and estimate equation 3.2 separately for female and male teachers.
Results obtained from ﬁxed eﬀect estimations are presented in the ﬁrst two columns
of Table 3.4. An increase in teacher hours per pupil has strongest eﬀect on male teachers
who reduce their absenteeism with 4.5 percent of a standard deviation if teacher hours
per pupil increases with one standard deviation. This may indicate that only male
teachers react on the school’s resource use. However, female teachers are more sensitive
to an increase in teacher man-year per pupil as is shown in column 2 of Table 3.5. If
teacher man-year per pupil increases with one standard deviation, female teachers lower
11With respect to the ﬁxed eﬀect speciﬁcation(s) in Appendix A, it is important to point out that the
results are driven by variation within very few teachers.
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their absenteeism with 1.2 percent of a standard deviation. A general conclusion about
resource use and gender diﬀerences is then diﬃcult to derive. Rather we are inclined
to say that both female and male teachers respond to the school’s resource use. The
point estimate of minority students is similar to the one in the pooled sample, whereas
only female teachers appear to increase their absenteeism if the fraction of special need
students increases. Regarding changes in workload and the contract type, the impact
on both genders resembles the ﬁndings in Table 3.3 to a large extent.
Columns (1) and (2) in appendix Table 3.8 report the eﬀects of the remaining individ-
ual control variables that correspond to column (1) and (2) of Table 3.4. Only female
teachers seem to respond to marital status and small children. The fact that only mar-
ried women have higher sick-leave is in accordance with Barmby et al. (2002). Salary
has still a negative eﬀect on absenteeism and the size of the coeﬃcients are similar to
the ones in appendix Table 3.7.
3.5.2 Age diﬀerences
Another dimension for which diﬀerences in sickness absenteeism are large is age. Al-
though sickness absenteeism is increasing in age, we still do not know the exact reason
why this is observed. One explanation is that health is negatively aﬀected by external
factors such as work pressure, allowing health problems to arise over time. On the other
hand, we cannot rule out that health itself simply is a declining function of time, imply-
ing that poorer health is inevitable when we become older. Separating these two eﬀects
are diﬃcult. However if only the latter explanation is relevant, we expect no systematic
diﬀerences to exist between young and old teachers with respect to the eﬀect of observed
characteristics. As an attempt to check this we stratify on the teachers age and estimate
equation 3.2 separately for old (born latest 1950) and young teachers (born after 1950).
The ﬁxed eﬀects estimates are presented in columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.4. The point
estimates of teacher hours per student is larger for old teachers than for young teachers.
However, if we interpret the eﬀects in terms of percent of a standard deviation, both
eﬀects are close to 2 if teacher hours per pupil increases with one standard deviation.12
Furthermore, both young and older teachers increase their absenteeism with about 7
percent of a standard deviation if they are given a ﬁxed work contract. Concerning the
student composition, the fraction of special need students has still the expected positive
sign for both age-groups, but as emphasized earlier, this eﬀect is very small. The eﬀect of
minority students is unchanged compared to the ﬁndings in previous tables. Thus, with
12Once again, the eﬀects of teacher man-year per pupil is fairly similar.
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respect to resource use, student composition and contract type the eﬀects are similar
to the ones in Table 3.3.13 Increased workload turns now out to have larger impact
on old teachers. The eﬀect amounts to 19 percent of a standard deviation if workload
increases with 10 percentage points and is highly signiﬁcant. This is a 35 percent increase
compared to the eﬀect in the pooled sample in column (2) of Table 3.3. The eﬀect for
young teachers is 11.6 percent of a standard deviation and is also signiﬁcant.
Summarized, older teachers appear to be more sensitive to changes in workload than
young teachers. This ﬁnding therefore supports that subsidized work time reduction for
older workers may be a good policy to lower sickness absenteeism among older workers
(Leuven, 2006).
Concerning the eﬀects of the remaining individual control variables that correspond
to the two last columns of Table 3.4, no big changes compared to the overall ﬁndings are
revealed. The only exception is that the dummy variable for small children only aﬀects
young teachers’ absenteeism (which is not surprising since having small children is less
frequent among older teachers). This is reported in the two last columns of appendix
Table 3.8.
3.6 Robustness checks
A relevant question that arises when studying sickness absenteeism is to what extent
the eﬀects are driven by the composition of the labor force (Askildsen et al., 2005; Araj
and Thoursie, 2005). In periods with excess demand for labor, marginal workers will
be employed to a larger degree, and these workers are expected to have higher sickness
rates on average due to poorer health. Similarly, the same type of workers may also be
the ﬁrst ones to leave when the labor market gets slacker again.
With respect to teachers, the teaching staﬀ is a function of the school size and also
the student composition. The demand for teachers automatically increases if school size
increases. Schools are also in need for extra teachers if the student composition worsen.
We can neither rule out that teachers leave the school sector for a job in other sectors,
especially in periods when the labor market is tight. In order to check whether our
results are driven by variation in the composition of the teaching staﬀ from year to year,
we restrict the sample to teachers who are present in the whole sample period (stable
worker sample).14 The results are presented in Table 3.6. The eﬀects of all variables are
13With respect to old teachers, it is important to point out that most of them have a ﬁxed position.
14Average sickness absenteeism for the stable worker sample is 4.76. This is 1.23 percentage points
lower compared to the whole sample. The standard deviation is 12.03.
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basically unchanged compared to the whole sample, but note that the eﬀect of teacher
hours becomes clearer. The only exception is being on a permanent work contract
which has now a smaller eﬀect, although it is still positive and mainly signiﬁcant at the
10 percent level. This suggest that teachers opting in and out of the education sector
account for a large part of the positive eﬀect of this variable derived in earlier tables.
3.7 Discussion and conclusion
In order to ﬁght sickness absenteeism it is necessary to accumulate knowledge about
possible sources that explain variation in sickness absenteeism.
Using longitudinal register data on teachers sickness absenteeism linked to school and
individual characteristics, this paper studies the eﬀect of workplace characteristics on
the amount of medical reported sickness absenteeism among teachers in public primary
and lower secondary school in Norway. Our ﬁndings suggest that teachers lower their
amount of sickness absenteeism when the school’s resource use increases. We also ﬁnd
evidence that increased workload and employment protection are associated with higher
absenteeism. Moreover, old teachers appear to be more sensitive to changes in workload
than young teachers. All results are derived from speciﬁcations where variation within
teachers who have not changed schools is used to identify the eﬀects.
To what extent we should be concerned about teacher absenteeism depends on its in-
ﬂuence on students outcome. This is a question which so far has been (almost) neglected
in the literature and more research on his ﬁeld is therefore highly demanded.
A. Appendix
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Table 3.7 – Table 3.3 cont’d
OLS FE
(1) (2)
individual control variables
Male teacher ¡2:3459
(0:0734)¤¤¤
Age 6:4526
(0:7519)¤¤¤
Age2 ¡0:2098 0:4674
(0:0277)¤¤¤ (0:0838)¤¤¤
Age3 0:0029 ¡0:0091
(0:0004)¤¤¤ (0:0013)¤¤¤
Age4/1000 ¡0:0136 0:0622
(0:0026)¤¤¤ (0:0075)¤¤¤
Number of children ¡0:3394 ¡2:7057
(0:0450)¤¤¤ (0:2326)¤¤¤
Child(ren) < = 12 year(s) 0:7036 0:3210
(0:0954)¤¤¤ (0:2048)
Salary (NOK)/1000 ¡0:1433 ¡0:1697
(0:0155)¤¤¤ (0:0556)¤¤¤
Education (ref = Unqualiﬁed)
- Bachelor 0:1840 ¡0:2720
(0:1922) (0:8150)
- Master or PhD ¡0:0417 ¡2:8499
(0:2563) (1:3715)¤¤
Marital status (ref = Unmarried)
- Married 0:4067 2:4455
(0:1061)¤¤¤ (0:3669)¤¤¤
- Widow/widower 0:3032 ¡10:2182
(0:3577) (1:2490)¤¤¤
- Divorced/separated 2:6415 1:2082
(0:1604)¤¤¤ (0:5322)¤¤
Note: See Table 3.3.
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4 The incentive eﬀects of property
taxation: Evidence from
Norwegian school districts
4.1 Introduction
Brennan and Buchanan (1980) emphasize that if governments are not entirely benevolent,
it is in the interest of voters to design tax systems to control a ‘Leviathan’ government.
Glaeser (1996) applies the ideas of Brennan and Buchanan to local property taxation. He
shows that when local government bureaucrats act as revenue-maximizing agents, a tax
base sensitive to changes in the quality of local goods and services produced is favorably
for the voters. When housing demand is inelastic, property taxation reduces waste
compared to lump sum taxation because local bureaucrats take into account the income
feedback via increased property values. High quality of local public goods and services is
associated with increased housing prices, yielding additional property tax revenue, which
in turn beneﬁts the local public sector bureaucrats. Wilson and Gordon (2003) develop
the argument of Glaeser (1996) in a richer model that accentuates competition between
jurisdictions. In their model, interjurisdictional competition reduces waste, raises the
utility of the residents, and increases the residents’ desired quality of public goods. The
argument is analogous to the property tax mechanism, as public oﬃcials beneﬁt from
“taking a smaller slice out of a larger pie” through the Tiebout process (Wilson and
Gordon, 2003, p. 401). Hoxby (1999) also provides a framework to analyze local costs
and eﬀort in which property taxation works as a discipline device. In line with Glaeser
she also argues that property taxation links school quality to school ﬁnance and helps
to control costs and improve eﬀort in schools.
Empirically, the incentive eﬀect of property taxation is hard to identify since most
countries have property taxation for all local governments. The Norwegian case, however,
is well suited for empirical analyses because one can compare local governments with
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and without property taxation. Moreover, since many local governments have property
taxation for exogenous reasons, the data allows taking into account potential endogeneity
problems. A credible test of the hypotheses put forward by Glaeser (1996) and Hoxby
(1999) can be conducted.
Borge and Rattsø (2006) present a ﬁrst investigation of the incentive eﬀects of property
taxation relying on data from Norwegian local governments. Using regression analysis
and matching on propensity scores, they ﬁnd that property taxation is negatively asso-
ciated with the unit costs in the production of sewage services. The current paper takes
a diﬀerent approach, and focus on public sector quality rather than costs. Theoretically
it is possible to look at the quality on all services provided by the local government.
Empirically we are restricted to focus on the sectors where data is available. We have
access to administrative test score data for two entire cohorts of students from their last
year in compulsory schooling. A natural choice is therefore to concentrate on the school
district’s quality of public schooling. This is also a highly conspicuous sector since the
largest part of the local budget (about 30 percent on average) is allocated to this sec-
tor. As each school district corresponds to one local government, we use the two terms
interchangeably.
A large related empirical literature has focused on the relationship between school
quality and housing prices. The key challenge faced by these studies is to distinguish
the impact of school quality from the impact of other neighbourhood characteristics.
Most studies, typically based on US data, ﬁnd that school quality is capitalized into
housing prices, e.g. Black (1999) and Kane et al. (2006), both applying a boundary
ﬁxed eﬀects approach and Figlio and Lucas (2004) evaluating whether the publication
of ‘school report cards’ contributed to changes in housing values. Others studies ﬁnd
weaker eﬀects, in particular with respect to value added measures, e.g. Brasington and
Haurin (2006) applying spatial econometrics as an identiﬁcation strategy, and Clapp et
al. (2007) using panel data. The only study applying Norwegian data is Machin and
Salvanes (2007). Exploiting a policy experiment they seek to identify the relationship
between housing prices and school performance on Norwegian high school data. Their
ﬁndings indicate that parents are willing to pay more to live in catchment areas of better
performing schools.
The empirical strategy of this paper follows the spirit of Hanushek et al. (1996). First,
we regress district-level ﬁxed eﬀects on student achievement, controlling for a rich set of
individual student demographics. Second, we use comprehensive district level character-
istics, including the use of property taxation, to explain the variation in the district ﬁxed
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eﬀects. The key methodological challenge is that districts can decide whether or not to
levy property taxation. It follows that diﬀerences in achievement cannot be causally at-
tributed to diﬀerences in the presence of property taxation. To handle this endogeneity
problem we rely on instrumental variable techniques. The instrumental variables are
derived from characteristics of the tax laws of 1911 and the property tax law of 1975.
The results are consistent with the theoretical framework put forward by Glaeser
(1996) and Hoxby (1999). Conditional on resource use, property taxation improves
school quality measured as students’ result on the national examination. With low
local ﬂexibility in teacher salaries and work hours, we believe the established beneﬁcial
eﬀect of property taxation to be related to organizational tasks within the school district
executed by school leaders and bureaucrats. Even though school districts face central
regulations on several aspects, such as maximum class size, they still have considerable
discretion on how to organize the school sector. However, it is important to point out
that in this paper we do not aim to establish a structural model where we explicitly
derive the channels the incentive mechanisms of property taxation work through. Our
contribution is to estimate a reduced form model where we investigate whether such
beneﬁcial eﬀects exist.
The structure of the paper is as follows; Section 4.2 presents the institutional setting;
Section 4.3 lines out the empirical strategy; Section 4.4 presents the results; Section 4.5
discusses the robustness of the main result and section 4.6 concludes the paper.
4.2 Institutional setting
4.2.1 Schooling
Compulsory schooling in Norway consists of primary education (1.-7. grade) and lower
secondary education (8.–10. grade). Public schools operated at the local government
level account for 98 percent of the students. Private schools are either religious schools
or schools that use alternative education methods and are not a part of this analysis. All
students are allocated to public schools by catchment areas within local governments.
There is no school choice for given residence. In addition to compulsory schooling, local
governments in Norway are also responsible for preschool education, care for the elderly
and some other services, such as infrastructure.
Our measure of school quality is based on a national written external examination
that all Norwegian students have to undertake at the end of tenth grade (the last year
in lower secondary school). Although the curriculum includes many diﬀerent subjects,
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both elective and compulsory, written examination is undertaken only in mathematics,
English, and Norwegian.1 Each student is examined in only one of the three subjects,
which is decided centrally shortly before the exam. In addition, students are graded by
their teachers. Both the exam results and the teacher grades matter for entrance to upper
secondary school. Since exam grades are externally determined, this measure provides
the most accurate measure of student achievement. Teacher grading may be severely
biased due to grade inﬂation and relative grading within schools and districts. The stu-
dent achievement data used in the present analysis are exam results for 118,178 students
who ﬁnished lower secondary school in the school years 2001/2002 and 2002/2003.2 The
grading goes from one to six, where six is the top score and one is fail. The exam grades
are fairly normally distributed, with a mean of 3.44 and a standard deviation of 1.07.
4.2.2 Local government ﬁnancing
Unlike local governments in the US, Norwegian local governments are largely ﬁnanced
through block grants and regulated income tax sharing. Close to 90 percent of the
local governments’ revenues are generated from central government grants and regulated
income taxes. The grants are distributed as block grants and are based on objective
criteria, partly as income tax equalization and partly as spending equalization. The
local governments set the income tax rate within a band determined by the central
government. Since all local governments apply the maximum income tax rate (and have
done so since 1977), both grants and income tax revenue consequently appear as given
from above. The remaining 10 percent of the local governments’ revenue comes from
user charges and property taxes which are the main revenue decisions made by the local
governments.3
Two types of property taxes exist: commercial and residential property taxation. The
former kind of taxation is not interesting in our setting because it is basically a tax on
power stations and primary industries. The current choice to have residential property
taxation is regulated by the property tax law of June 6th, 1975. This law restricts resi-
dential property taxation to urban areas (§ 3). Urban areas can choose to levy property
taxation. Non-urban areas are prohibited from levying residential property taxation.4
1Norway have two oﬃcial written languages (Norwegian and New Norwegian), and an exam has to be
undertaken in both of them.
2The total number of students ﬁnishing in 2001/2002 and 2002/2003 is 122,281 students. Because of
missing data on some explanatory variables we are left with 118,178 observations in the analysis
3User charges are primarily levied for infrastructure services to residents (water supply etc.) and are
limited by national regulations saying that user charges cannot exceed total production costs.
4Property taxation can also be levied in non-urban areas from 2007.
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The deﬁnition of an urban area is not clear cut and there are many court cases where
property owners have argued that the area under taxation is not urban. However, resi-
dential property taxation in 2001 seems to be a choice among school districts with more
than 2500 inhabitants. Only three local governments with less than 2500 inhabitants
(out of 130) use residential property taxation.
Local governments take spending decisions regarding 15-20 percent of GDP, but face
regulations concerning both coverage and standards of welfare services. The regulations
imply a sort of centralized spending that matches the centralized ﬁnancing (Rattsø,
2003). In this setting, user charge ﬁnancing and property taxation are important rev-
enue sources at the margin. Earlier Norwegian studies illustrate that decisions on user
charges and property taxation are important political decisions. Borge (2000) analyzes
the determinants of user charges, and ﬁnds strong evidence of revenue substitution. User
charges increase when other sources of revenue become more restricted. The choice of
having property taxation is investigated by Fiva and Rattsø (2007) in a model allowing
for yardstick competition. Borge and Rattsø (2004) ﬁnd that an equal income distribu-
tion aﬀects the mix of revenues from property taxation and user charges.
4.3 Empirical strategy
The object of the current paper is to investigate whether property taxation works as
a disciplining device on local school leaders and bureaucrats. When aiming to isolate
the incentive eﬀect of property taxation on school quality, it is clearly important to
control for all other features of the school districts that aﬀect student achievement (and
might be correlated with property taxation). In particular, it is well known that fam-
ily background characteristics are important determinants of student achievement. In
our analysis we are able to control for a large number of family characteristics at the
individual level.
Our estimation strategy contains two steps and draws on Hanushek et al. (1996).5 In
the ﬁrst step we estimate the impact of each student’s family background characteristics
(Fij) on individual exam performance (Aij) and a separate indicator variable for each
school district (Eij):6
Aij = ± + Fij³ +
X
j
®jEij + ¹ij (4.1)
5Borjas (1987) applied a similar strategy to study the impact of political and economic conditions in
US immigrants home countries on US earnings (see Borjas’ footnote 21 for his two step approach).
6Because achievement is only measured by the end in grade 10, a value added speciﬁcation is not
feasible.
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where (Eij) are dummy variables that equals 1 if student i lives in school district j
and 0 otherwise, and ¹ij is an i.i.d. error term. Because of the discrete nature of the
student achievement variable, there is a rationale for utilizing the ordered probit model.
However, when we are interested in the school district ﬁxed eﬀects we need to rely on
standard Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The ﬁxed eﬀects ordered probit is inconsistent
and suﬀers from the so-called incidental parameters problem (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 484).
Included in Fij is the student’s gender, age and immigrant status, parent’s education
and marital status and the household’s income.7 The school district ﬁxed eﬀects, ®j, can
be interpreted as student performance conditional on family background. In the second
step we utilize the school district ﬁxed eﬀects to investigate whether school districts
that levy residential property taxation have a higher level of student achievement. The
following education production function is estimated at the school district level:
®j = ¸+ ¯DPTAXj + °1Rj + µ1Cj + "j (4.2)
where the regressor of primary interest, DPTAXj is a dummy for residential property
taxation, and Rj is a variable capturing resource use in the school sector. It is crucial not
to mix up the eﬀects of increased resources spent and the incentive mechanism caused by
property taxation. As a measure on resource use we include teacher hours per student.
This is a very precise measure on how much time the teacher spends in the classroom.8
In addition we control for other characteristics at the district level Cj. "j is an error
term. Included in Cj are several school district characteristics that capture scale eﬀects
in the production of education: enrollment, enrollment squared, (the log of) population
size and traveling distance within zone. The latter variable explicitly captures time
used on traveling within the school district.9 Since other studies have found teacher
experience to be an important determinant of student achievement in Norway we also
include average teacher experience as an explanatory variable (Leuven et al., 2007b).
Finally, we acknowledge that the controls for family background in the ﬁrst step, given
7In other settings one would look to ethnic diﬀerences to explain diﬀerences in educational performance.
In the Norwegian setting however, immigrant status is suﬃcient to capture diﬀerences in educational
performance related to ethnic diﬀerences, since the general population is ethnically very homogenous.
8An alternative measure is expenditures per student which we will use as a robustness check. The raw
correlation between expenditures per student and teacher education hours per student is 0.76.
9Travelling distance is measured as the average number of kilometres from the centre of each ‘neigh-
bourhood’ (weighted by population size) to the centre of the zone. Each zone is a contiguous
geographical area of ‘neighborhoods’ and is intended to reﬂect a proper organization of the school
district. The centre of the zone is deﬁned as the most populous ‘neighborhood’. A densely populated
school district will typically consist of many zones. If fewer than 2000 inhabitants live in the school
district then the school district constitute one zone.
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by Equation (4.1), may not completely capture the eﬀect of demographic composition
in the district. Unobserved diﬀerences in family background across districts may still
remain in the error term. Therefore, we include several family background characteristics
at the school district level (median private income, educational level in the population,
the unemployment rate and the share of the population that is divorced or separated).
Descriptive statistics of all variables are provided in the appendix, Table 4.7.
Because the actual school district ﬁxed eﬀects are not observed, we need to use the
predicted values from the ﬁrst step estimation. Using the ﬁrst step predicted values
introduces an additional error to the second step regression because of sampling error of
the form ®j = ®¤j+´j, which implies that the second step becomes a random components
model:
®j = ¸+ ¯DPTAXj + °1Rj + µ1Cj + !j (4.3)
where !j = "j + ´j. Because the precision in the estimates of ®j will diﬀer across school
districts (in particular between small and large school districts), ´jwill be heteroskedastic.
A possible strategy to correct for this is to assume that the variance of ´j is proportional
to the ﬁrst stage sampling variance of ®j and use weighted least squares in the second
stage regression, weighted with the inverse of the sampling variance of ®j. Such a
strategy implies however that the other component of the error term "j has a variance
that is either 0 or proportional to ´j (Hanushek et al., 1996). To allow a more ﬂexible
structure we use a specialized form of generalized least squares (GLS) in the second
step. First we estimate Equation (4.2) with ordinary least squares (OLS). Second, we
run an auxiliary regression where we regress the square of the residuals on the sampling
variance of ®j and a constant term. Finally, we use the inverse of the predicted square
of residuals from this regression as the weight in the GLS estimation of (4.3).
4.3.1 Endogeneity
Since residential property taxation is voluntary among urban school districts diﬀerences
in achievement cannot be causally attributed to diﬀerences in the presence of property
taxation. Even with the extensive list of controls included on both the individual and
on the school district level, a GLS estimate of ¯ may still capture the eﬀect of some
omitted school district characteristic or reverse causality. Note that the sign of the bias
is not clear a priori. To address this potential endogeneity issue we need variation in
property taxation that is arguably not subject to the choice of school district. We argue
that characteristics of the historic and current property tax legislation provide such
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variation. The tax laws of 1911 governed the use of property taxation prior to 1975,
while the property tax law of 1975 are the regulations in force in 2001. In what follows
we elaborate this argument.
4.3.2 Instruments for property taxation
Historically Norwegian local governments were separated into bykommuner (towns) and
herredskommuner (countryside local governments). The formal division between bykom-
muner and herredskommuner was established in 1837 when local self-government was
introduced. Until 1975 two diﬀerent tax laws existed for the two diﬀerent types of local
governments. Both tax laws, passed August 18th, 1911, included regulations regard-
ing the use of residential property taxation. While residential property taxation was
mandatory in towns, school districts on the countryside could choose to levy residential
property taxation.
Until 1996 town status was historically solely assigned by the central government.
And the decision was very stable over time. Based on the school district structure of
2001, 56 (out of a total number of 434) school districts had town status in 1911. And
45 out of these 56 remained towns from 1911 to 1975. Moreover 34 out of these 45
school districts had town status since the establishment of the local self-government in
1837. This historical township status in combination with the historical tax laws of
1911 creates exogenous variation in the school districts’ use of property taxation. As a
ﬁrst instrument we therefore suggest an indicator variable which equals one if the school
district continuously had town status from 1911 to 1975 and zero otherwise (town). 15
school districts had town status for some, but not all years between 1911 and 1975.
However all of these had town status uninterruptedly for at least 33 years.10 The main
results from this analysis do not change if we include these school districts as towns in
our instrumental variable strategy.
Although residential property taxation was no longer mandatory for towns after the
new property tax law of 1975, 77 percent of the school districts in our sample that were
10In 1911, 661 school districts existed, but several have merged since 1911, in particular due to a reform
taking place in the 1960s. This reform consolidated around 750 school districts into around 450. Two
school districts lost their town status in 1944 and another nine lost their town status in the 1960s.
Four school districts were given town status between 1911 and 1924. Three of these lost their status
in the 1960s. No new towns were established between 1924 and 1975 (or between 1975 and 1995).
The Local Government Act of 1992 removed the last formal division between towns and other local
governments. There were no longer any need for the central government to assign town status, and
from 1996 on, the local governments could choose to deﬁne themselves as towns. From 1995 to 2005
the number of Norwegian towns increased from 46 to 93.
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uninterruptedly classiﬁed as towns from 1911 till 1975 still levied residential property
taxation in 2001. The lower panel of Table 4.1 illustrates that to a great extent the school
districts’ current use of property taxation is associated with the historical township
status of the school district.11
Our second instrument variable relates to the property tax law of 1975. This law
restricts residential property taxation to urban areas. Consequently, variables that cap-
ture the current settlement pattern in the school district also have the potential to work
as instruments. We pursue this strategy and suggest ’the share of the population in
the school district living in rural areas (rural)’ as a second instrumental variable.12 The
upper panel of Table 4.1 shows that there is a strong relationship between residential
property taxation and settlement pattern.
Our ﬁrst stage regression in the two stage least squares approach (2SLS), is given by:13
DPTAXj = ¸2 + ±ruralj +$townj + °2Rj + µ2Cj + uj (4.4)
We expect ‘rural’ to have a negative impact on implementation of property taxation
(± < 0) and ‘town’ to have a positive impact ($ > 0). Note that since our potential
endogenous regressor, DPTAX, is binary, it may seem appropriate to use a probit or
a logit to estimate Equation (4.4) and obtain predicted values. However, this is not
necessary and may even produce inconsistent estimates in the second stage. Consistency
of the second stage estimates does not depended on getting the ﬁrst stage functional form
right (Kelejian, 1971; Angrist and Krueger, 2001). Hence, we rely on standard OLS in
the ﬁrst stage regression.
The exclusion restriction E[!jjtownj] = E[!jjruralj] = 0 requires that the only eﬀect
of ’rural’ and ‘town’ on achievement is via the presence of property taxation. This may
seem as a strong assumption to make for two reasons. First, student and family charac-
teristics are likely to be correlated with the rural-urban dimension while simultaneously
being important in determining student achievement. Second, economics of scale in the
production of education is likely to be correlated with the rural-urban dimension. We
argue, however, that with the broad set of controls that we have available we are able
11Table 4.1 is based on the 425 school districts that are used in the empirical analysis.
12Statistics Norway has generated the “share of population in the school district living in rural areas”
in the following way: Every household in a school district are assigned to a cluster of houses where
each cluster is classiﬁed to be either rural or urban. For a cluster to be classiﬁed as urban it must
fulﬁl two criteria: 1) the cluster of houses must contain at least 200 people, 2) The distance between
the houses within the cluster cannot exceed 50 metres (except where houses cannot be built because
of parks, rivers etc).
13It is important not to mix this ﬁrst stage with the “ﬁrst step” represented by Equation (4.1).
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Table 4.1 – Current settlement pattern (2001), historical town sta-
tus (1911-1975) and residential property tax.
School districts
With property taxation Total
% Living in rural areas (2001)
0-10% 50%(N = 17) 34
10-20% 50%(N = 20) 40
20-30% 39%(N = 14) 36
30-40% 36%(N = 21) 58
40-50% 29%(N = 14) 49
50-60% 24%(N = 12) 50
60-70% 13%(N = 7) 52
70-80% 6%(N = 3) 54
80-90% 6%(N = 1) 16
90-100% 0%(N = 0) 36
Town status (1911-1975)
Town 77%(N = 34) 44
No town 20%(N = 75) 381
Overall 26%(N = 109) 425
Note: The deﬁnition of ‘rural areas’ is provided in footnote 13. The
most rural school district that levies residential property taxation has
81% of the population living in rural areas. The raw correlation between
‘town status’ and ‘the share of the population living in rural areas’ is
-0.37.
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to control properly for family and school district characteristics that may aﬀect student
achievement. ‘Traveling distance within zone’ (deﬁned in footnote 9) is in particular
an important control variable. It captures diﬀerences along the rural-urban dimension
that may be important for the outcome of interest (due to scale eﬀects), and is at the
same time uncorrelated with the decision to have residential property taxation, given
our instruments.14 Notwithstanding, the exclusion restriction is further investigated in
section 4.5.2.
4.4 Results
In the ﬁrst step in our estimation strategy we ﬁnd the expected eﬀects of family back-
ground characteristics on student achievement. In particular, we ﬁnd that the achieve-
ment level increases with the parents’ income and educational levels. Table 4.2 presents
the results from Equation (4.1).
The school district ﬁxed eﬀects, which will serve as our dependent variable in the
remaining analysis, come out as highly jointly statistically signiﬁcant. The F-statistic
for joint signiﬁcance equals 4.72, statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. There is
substantial variation in the school district ﬁxed eﬀects.15 Compared to Oslo, the ‘worst’
and ‘best’ school districts have average achievement levels of around one grade lower
and one grade higher, respectively.
The second step of the analysis is to estimate the eﬀect of residential property taxation
on student achievement, represented by the school district ﬁxed eﬀects. However, as
discussed above we need to rely on instrumental variable techniques to obtain reliable
inference on the causal eﬀect of property taxation on student achievement. Table 4.3
presents results from the ﬁrst stage regression given by Equation (4.4). Speciﬁcation
(a) and (b) report estimated coeﬃcients when the two instrumental variables, ‘town’
and ‘rural’, are included separately, while both are included in speciﬁcation (c). In line
with the descriptive statistics presented in Table 4.1, the ﬁrst stage shows that the two
instruments are strong predictors of residential property taxation. The F-test for joint
14The raw correlation between ‘traveling distance within zone’ and the dummy for residential property
taxation is -0.16.
15The school district ﬁxed eﬀects is based on data from all 434 school districts. In the further analysis
we exclude the capital Oslo because the organization of the local council diﬀers from the rest of the
school districts. We also drop one school district which is an extreme outlier from the ﬁrst step to
ensure that all estimated variances in the second stage are positive and another seven school districts
due to missing observations, leaving us with 425 observations. Estimating Equation (1) where we
restrain the sample to include only those 425 school districts we utilize in the second step yields
identical results.
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Table 4.2 – Computation of school district ﬁxed
eﬀects. Dependent variable is the individual
exam result.
Girl 0:340
(0:006)¤¤¤
Age (years) 0:062
(0:009)¤¤¤
ln (family income) 0:108
(0:005)¤¤¤
Education mother (years) 0:076
(0:001)¤¤¤
Education father (years) 0:067
(0:001)¤¤¤
1st or 2nd generation immigrant ¡0:095
(0:015)¤¤¤
Parents non-cohabiting ¡0:124
(0:014)¤¤¤
R-squared 0.1947
N 118,178
School district ﬁxed eﬀects Yes
Estimation method OLS
Note: The unit of observation is the individual stu-
dent. Included in the regression, but not reported
are a constant term, a year dummy, dummies for
diﬀerent subjects, and school districts ﬁxed eﬀects.
The capital, Oslo, is the reference school district,
which is not included in the second step. Standard
errors are in parentheses. *** denotes statistical
signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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signiﬁcance of the excluded instrument(s) in the linear probability model obtains values
between 19.35 and 21.39. We conclude that ‘town’ and ‘rural’ do not suﬀer from the
problems related to weak instruments. As expected ‘traveling distance within zone’ does
not come out statistically signiﬁcant.
Table 4.4 presents the second stage results obtained from Equation (4.3). As a bench-
mark for evaluating the results we provide the standard GLS ignoring the potential
endogeneity problem related to our key explanatory variable. The eﬀect of property
taxation is estimated to be 0.052 and is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
This result is the ﬁrst indication that property taxation has a favorable incentive eﬀect
on school oﬃcials, stimulating them to provide eﬀective and high quality schooling in
line with arguments of Glaeser (1996) and Hoxby (1999). The positive and statistically
signiﬁcant relationship between property taxation and student achievement is conﬁrmed
when we use ‘rural’ and ‘town’ as instruments for the dummy for residential property
taxation. The point estimate increases from 0.052 in standard GLS to 0.163 in the 2SLS
estimation using both instruments simultaneously. The naive GLS estimate seems to
be downward biased which suggests a negative correlation between property taxation
and the disturbance term in Equation (4.3). This suggests that public sector quality is
negatively correlated with the decision to implement property taxation. The estimated
coeﬃcient for property taxation is considerably higher than the benchmark GLS esti-
mation also when ‘town’ and ‘rural’ are used separately as instruments and the eﬀect
is statically signiﬁcant at the 10 and 5 percent level, respectively. We interpret this as
evidence of property taxation having favorable incentive eﬀects on local school leaders
and bureaucrats. An alternative interpretation is that property taxation increases pop-
ular control of the bureaucrats because property taxation represents a direct and visible
inﬂuence on the private economy of the inhabitants.
Although we are primarily interested in testing whether there are beneﬁcial incentive
eﬀects of property taxation, it is interesting to evaluate how large this eﬀect is. An in-
crease in average student achievement of 0.163 grading points, as suggested by our main
speciﬁcation (g), corresponds to (slightly above) one standard deviation increase in the
school district ﬁxed eﬀects. The disciplining eﬀect of property taxation on school leaders
leads to a one grading point increase for around one out of six students. Although the
standard error related to the estimated eﬀect of property taxation on student achieve-
ment is admittedly quite large, the incentive eﬀect seems to be substantial.
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Table 4.3 – First stage estimations: Historical town status (1911-1975), cur-
rent settlement pattern and the probability of levying residential property
tax. Dependent variable is a dummy for residential property tax.
Speciﬁcation (a) (b) (c)
Rural ¡0:543 0:319
(0:119)¤¤¤ (0:078)¤¤¤
Town 0:361 ¡0:479
(0:079)¤¤¤ (0:118)¤¤
Teacher hours per student 0:004 0:004 0:004
(0:002)¤¤¤ (0:002)¤¤ (0:001)¤¤
Traveling distance within zone ¡0:003 ¡0:001 0:000
(0:003) (0:003) (0:003)
Enrollment 0:004 0:002 0:004
(0:003) (0:002) (0:002)
Enrollment2/1000 ¡0:028 ¡0:017 ¡0:027
(0:014)¤¤ (0:014) (0:014)
ln (population) 0:158 0:163 0:116
(0:039)¤¤¤ (0:039)¤¤¤ (0:040)¤¤¤
Teacher experience 0:013 0:013 0:014
(0:007)¤¤ (0:007)¤¤ (0:007)¤¤
Low. sec. ¡0:056 ¡0:572 ¡0:091
(0:586) (0:574) (0:575)
High. sec. ¡0:330 ¡0:494 ¡0:246
(0:699) (0:697) (0:686)
Unemployment rate 1:869 0:439 0:291
(1:282) (1:343) (1:318)
Divorce rate ¡0:884 ¡0:040 ¡1:208
(1:495) (1:470) (1:470)
Median income (1000 NOK) ¡0:002 ¡0:006 ¡0:005
(0:001) (0:002)¤¤¤ (0:002)¤¤¤
R-squared 0:247 0:246 0:276
N 425 425 425
Joint signiﬁcance of instruments,
F-test (p-value) 21.39 (0.00) 20.81 (0.00) 19.35 (0.00)
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS
Note: The unit of observation is the school district. Included in the regressions,
but not reported, is a constant term. ***, **, and * denote statistical signiﬁcance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 4.4 – The eﬀect of residential property tax on student achievement. Dependent
variable is the school district ﬁxed eﬀects.
Speciﬁcation (d) (e) (f) (g)
DPTAX 0:052 0.190 0.138 0:163
(0:019)¤¤¤ (0.090)** (0.083)* (0:065)¤¤
Teacher hours per student ¡0:001 -0.002 -0.001 ¡0:001
(0:001) (0.001)* (0.001)* (0:001)¤
Traveling distance within zone 0:004 0.005 0.005 0:005
(0:002)¤¤¤ (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0:002)¤¤¤
Enrollment ¡0:003 -0.003 -0.003 ¡0:003
(0:001)¤¤¤ (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0:001)¤¤¤
Enrollment2/1000 0:011 0.012 0.012 0:012
(0:006)¤¤ (0.006)** (0.006)* (0:006)¤¤
ln (population) 0:000 -0.032 -0.020 ¡0:026
(0:016) (0.027) (0.025) (0:022)
Teacher experience 0:008 0.006 0.007 0:006
(0:003)¤¤¤ (0.003)* (0.003)** (0:003)¤¤
Low. sec. ¡1:074 -0.969 -1.009 ¡0:990
(0:242)¤¤¤ (0.265)*** (0.255)*** (0:256)¤¤¤
High. sec. ¡0:711 -0.629 -0.660 ¡0:645
(0:290)¤¤ (0.312)** (0.301)** (0:304)¤¤
Unemployment rate ¡0:656 -1.058 -0.906 ¡0:979
(0:572) (0.659) (0.632) (0:622)
Divorce rate ¡1:476 -1.590 -1.547 ¡1:567
(0:615)¤¤ (0.657)** (0.634)** (0:642)¤¤
Median income (1000 NOK) ¡0:001 0.000 0.000 0:000
(0:001) (0.001) (0.001) (0:001)
R-squared 0:189
N 425 425 425 425
Instrument(s) for property tax town rural town, rural
Sargan’s test (p-value) 0.21 (0.64)
Estimation method GLS GLS-IV GLS-IV GLS-2SLS
Note: The unit of observation is the school district. Included in the regressions, but not
reported, is a constant term. ***, **, and * denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels, respectively.
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4.5 Sensitivity analysis
4.5.1 Resource use and the disciplining eﬀect of property taxation
A potential critique of our central result might be that revenue from property taxation
yields increased spending in the education sector, which our resource use variable fails
to capture. This may be important if increased spending increases student performance.
To further investigate whether this is a relevant critique, we have run an additional re-
gression where ‘expenditures per student’ is included as an alternative resource measure.
The property tax eﬀect is basically unaltered when ‘teacher hours per student’ is
substituted with ‘expenditures per student’ (speciﬁcation (h) in Table 4.5) and when
both measures are included simultaneously (not reported). In line with a large literature,
we ﬁnd that resource use do not seem to have any impact on student performance (e.g.
Hanushek, 2002). However, since resource use is likely to be endogenous we are not
necessarily obtaining the causal eﬀect of resource on student achievement. The important
point in our setting is that the estimated eﬀect of property taxation is very robust to
diﬀerent deﬁnitions of resource use and also that the eﬀect is unaltered if we exclude
measures of resource use (speciﬁcation (i) in Table 4.5).
Finally we investigate whether the eﬀect of resource use is dependent on the cost
structure in the school district, by interacting our measure of resource use with ‘traveling
distance’, ‘enrollment’ and ‘enrollment2’. These measures are likely to capture potential
diﬀering cost eﬀects across districts in the production of education. We ﬁnd some support
in favor a diﬀerential eﬀect of resource use. In particular, the positive sign of the
interaction eﬀect of enrollment2 and ‘teacher hours per student’ suggest that the resource
use eﬀect is increasing non-linearly in enrollment. As an example, consider two school
districts where one has an average (student weighted) school size (‘enrollment’) of 28
and the other has an average (student weighted) school size of 78. These numbers
correspond to the ﬁrst and third quartile in ‘enrollment’. Based on speciﬁcation (k), the
eﬀect of increasing ‘teacher hours per student’ with one standard deviation (18 hours)
is estimated to be -0.007 for the district with small schools and 0.081 for the district
with large schools. But, most importantly in our setting, allowing for a diﬀerential eﬀect
of resource use based on traveling distance or enrollment leave the estimated impact of
property taxation on student achievement basically unaltered.
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Table 4.5 – The eﬀect of residential property tax on student achievement, further in-
vestigations of the role of resource use. Dependent variable is the school district ﬁxed
eﬀects.
Speciﬁcation (h) (i) (j) (k)
DPTAX 0:161 0:162 0:171 0:153
(0:066)¤¤ (0:065)¤¤ (0:063)¤¤¤ (0:063)¤¤¤
Teacher hours per student (th) ¡0:001 ¡0:001
(0:001) (0:001)
Expenditures per student 0:001
(0:001)
Traveling distance within zone (tz) 0:004 0:004 0:015 0:005
(0:002)¤¤ (0:002)¤¤¤ (0:008)¤ (0:002)¤¤¤
(tz*th)/100 ¡0:010
(0:008)
Enrollment ¡0:002 ¡0:002 ¡0:003 0:001
(0:001)¤ (0:001)¤¤ (0:001)¤¤¤ (0:004)
Enrollment2/1000 0:009 0:010 0:012 ¡0:053
(0:006) (0:006)¤ (0:006)¤¤ (0:004)
(Enrollment*th)/1000 ¡0:007
(0:005)
(Enrollment2*tz)/1000 0:001
(0:000)¤¤
ln (population) ¡0:017 ¡0:020 ¡0:026 ¡0:019
(0:022) (0:022) (0:022) (0:021)
Teacher experience 0:007 0:007 0:006 0:006
(0:003)¤¤ (0:003)¤¤ (0:003)¤¤ (0:003)¤¤
Low. sec. ¡0:929 ¡0:942 ¡0:968 ¡0:997
(0:259)¤¤¤ (0:257)¤¤ (0:257)¤¤¤ (0:252)¤¤¤
High. sec. ¡0:521 ¡0:574 ¡0:646 ¡0:618
(0:309)¤ (0:304)¤ (0:306)¤¤ (0:301)¤¤
Unemployment rate ¡1:108 ¡1:102 ¡0:937 ¡0:792
(0:630)¤ (0:628)¤ (0:631) (0:612)
Divorce rate ¡1:799 ¡1:716 ¡1:495 ¡1:608
(0:645)¤¤¤ (0:642)¤¤¤ (0:650)¤¤ (0:637)¤¤
Median income (1000 NOK) 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
(0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001)
N 423 425 425 425
Sargan’s test (p-value) 0.37 (0.54) 0.33 (0.58) 0.18 (0.67) 0.18 (0.67)
Note: The unit of observation is the school district. Both ’town’ and ’rural’ are used as
instruments in all speciﬁcations (h) -( k) and all speciﬁcations (h) - (k) are estimated with GLS
- 2SLS. Included in the regressions, but not reported, is a constant term. ***, **, and * denote
statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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4.5.2 Empirical investigation of the exclusion restriction
The validity of the identiﬁcation strategy pursued in this analysis rests on the assumption
that ‘rural’ and ‘town’ are excludable from our structural equation in the sense that
they relate to student achievement only through their inﬂuence on residential property
taxation. The key challenge for obtaining reliable inference is that diﬀerences along the
rural-urban dimension still exist even after conditioning on the broad set of controls
that we have available. If this is the case, ‘rural’ and ‘town’ are invalid as instruments
and should be included in the second stage regression, rather than in the ﬁrst stage
regression. According to the Sargan instrument validity test, this does not seem to be a
relevant critique. The test fails to reject the null that our instruments are uncorrelated
with the error term in all speciﬁcations (with p-values above 0.5 in all speciﬁcations).
However, since it is widely acknowledged that overidentiﬁcation tests have low power in
certain settings (e.g. Newey, 1985), we also cut the sample according to property tax
status and run the following ‘second step’ regressions:
®j = ¸+ 'ruralj + Átownj + °2Rj + µ2Cj + !j (4.5)
If our exclusion restriction is valid then ‘rural’ and ‘town’ should not have any impact on
student achievement when we condition on the decision to have property taxation (and
the other control variables). The eﬀects of ‘rural’ and ‘town’ on student achievement are
statistically insigniﬁcant both for the sample of school districts with property taxation
and for school districts without property taxation (results are reported in the appendix,
Table 4.8. We conclude that unobserved diﬀerences across the rural-urban dimension do
not seem to be driving our main result.
4.5.3 Spatial dependence
In an extension of our baseline model we focus on interdistrict school competition. School
district competition is likely to appear as a spatial in pattern in school quality. Inter-
district school district competition can arise either because school districts face out-
migration (in-migration) if they provide low (high) quality schooling or because of some
form of yardstick competition. An observed spatial pattern in school district quality is
not necessarily due to competition among school districts. Common shocks and unob-
served correlates will also appear as spatial dependence. Whatever the causes of spatial
dependence, ignoring it may give biased and inconsistent estimates. Spatial dependence
is however not biasing the eﬀect of property taxation on student achievement, given
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that our instruments are valid. Nonetheless, incorporating spatial dependence provide
a relevant robustness test of the key ﬁnding in this analysis.
To test for spatial dependence we follow the empirical literature on interjurisdictional
competition and relate the value of the dependent variable at a given school district to
its value at neighboring locations in our regression analysis.16 We deﬁne neighbors as
school districts with a common border. The spatial weight matrix that we apply is row-
standardized, ensuring that the spatially lagged dependent variable can be interpreted as
a weighted average of neighboring school districts’ school quality. A non-zero coeﬃcient
is consistent with interdistrict school competition.
The spatial econometric literature recommends either instrumental variable or max-
imum likelihood methods to handle the simultaneity problem inherent in spatial lag
models. For simplicity we have decided to ignore the simultaneity problem, since we are
introducing spatial dependence primarily as a robustness check. To provide a method
that unify the econometric approach based on Hanushek et al. (1996) and take into
account the endogeneity of the spatially lagged dependent variable is beyond the scope
of the current paper. The simultaneity problem yields upward biased estimates of the
spatial lag parameter.
Table 4.6 reproduces the results from Table 4.4, but includes a spatially lagged depen-
dent variable, assumed to be exogenous. The positive parameter estimate with upward
bias of around 0.3 is consistent with the school district competition hypothesis.17 Blair
and Staley (1995), which also ignore simultaneity, ﬁnd for comparison an eﬀect of ap-
proximately 0.4 on US data. In another recent US study, Millimet and Rangaprasad
(2007) ﬁnd that school districts compete with neighboring school districts in the choice
of educational inputs.
Controlling for spatial dependence, the estimated eﬀects of property taxation on school
quality are similar, but somewhat reduced to the corresponding non-spatial speciﬁcations.
The property tax eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant at least at the 10 percent level in all
speciﬁcations, except in speciﬁcation (n) where we only utilize ‘rural’ as an instrument.
We conclude that the property tax dummy does not seem to capture school district
competition or other spatially correlated omitted variables.
16Revelli (2005) presents an overview of diﬀerent studies utilizing this approach and discusses econo-
metric issues.
17The Moran test on the residuals from the speciﬁcations reported in Table 4.4 also shows spatial
dependence (statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level).
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Table 4.6 – The eﬀect of residential property tax on student achievement controlling
for spatial dependence. Dependent variable is the school district ﬁxed eﬀects.
Speciﬁcation (l) (m) (n) (o)
DPTAX 0:039 0:163 0:070 0:120
(0:019)¤¤ (0:093)¤ (0:094) (0:069)¤
Teacher hours per student ¡0:001 ¡0:001 ¡0:001 ¡0:001
(0:001) (0:001)¤ (0:001) (0:001)¤
Traveling distance within zone 0:004 0:005 0:004 0:004
(0:002)¤¤ (0:002)¤¤¤ (0:002)¤¤ (0:002)¤¤¤
Enrollment 0:009 0:010 0:009 0:010
(0:006) (0:006)¤ (0:006)¤ (0:006)¤
Enrollment2/1000 ¡0:002 ¡0:003 ¡0:002 ¡0:003
(0:001)¤¤ (0:001)¤¤ (0:001)¤¤ (0:001)¤¤
ln (population) 0:000 ¡0:029 ¡0:007 ¡0:019
(0:016) (0:026) (0:026) (0:022)
Teacher experience 0:009 0:007 0:008 0:007
(0:003)¤¤¤ (0:003)¤¤ (0:003)¤¤ (0:003)¤¤
Low. sec. ¡0:948 ¡0:893 ¡0:934 ¡0:912
(0:237)¤¤¤ (0:253)¤¤¤ (0:241)¤¤¤ (0:244)¤¤¤
High. sec. ¡0:713 ¡0:638 ¡0:694 ¡0:665
(0:281)¤¤ (0:301)¤¤ (0:287)¤¤ (0:290)¤¤
Unemployment rate ¡0:591 ¡0:971 ¡0:685 ¡0:838
(0:560) (0:651) (0:628) (0:608)
Divorce rate ¡0:722 ¡1:051 ¡0:804 ¡0:936
(0:626) (0:701) (0:673) (0:664)
Median income (1000 NOK) 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
Spatial lag 0:348 0:246 0:323 0:282
(0:086)¤¤¤ (0:117)¤¤ (0:115)¤¤¤ (0:103)¤¤¤
R-squared 0:225
N 425 425 425 425
Instrument(s) for property tax town rural town,rural
Sargan’s test (p-value) 0.60 (0.44)
Estimation method GLS GLS – IV GLS - IV GLS – 2SLS
Note: The unit of observation is the school district. Included in the regressions, but not
reported, is a constant term. ***, **, and * denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels, respectively
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4.6 Conclusion
Several researchers have asserted that ineﬃciency in the public sector arises from a lack
of incentives to behave eﬃciently. When output is not well deﬁned, as in the education
sector, it may be hard to detect ineﬃcient production. Monitoring may simply be too
diﬃcult. Residential property taxation may help overcome this problem by establishing
a direct relationship between the tax level and the beneﬁts received by taxpayers through
capitalization of public sector quality into housing prices.
Utilizing a well-suited data set from the educational sector in Norway, we ﬁnd evidence
that students living in school districts levying residential property taxation perform
better at the nationally decided external examination than other students. The main
result holds when we utilize variation in property taxation driven by the tax laws from
1911 and the property tax law from 1975 in a two stage least squares framework. All
the results presented in this analysis corroborate the theoretical framework put forward
by Glaeser (1996) and Hoxby (1999) well. These studies emphasize that local property
taxation gives bureaucrats incentives to maintain an eﬃcient and well functioning public
sector by stronger linking public sector quality to public sector ﬁnancing. The current
analysis shows that these theoretically consistent mechanisms also seem to matter in
practice.
A. Appendix
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Table 4.7 – Summary statistics and data description.
Variable Mean s.d.
Individual characteristics (N=118,178)
- Girl 0.49 0.50
- Age (measured in years) 14.52 0.30
- ln (family income) 13.27 0.66
- Education mother (measured in years) 11.82 2.71
- Education father (measured in years) 11.96 2.85
- 1st or 2nd generation immigrant 0.04 0.20
- Parents non-cohabiting 0.30 0.46
- Parents married 0.65 0.48
School district characteristics (N=425)
- School district ﬁxed eﬀectsa -0.02 0.14
- Property taxation, dymmy = 1 if school district levy property
tax and zero otherwise (DPTAX)
0.26 0.44
- Teacher hours per student 85.39 17.83
- Expenditures per student (1000 NOK) 64.63 13.73
- Traveling distance within zoneb 8.14 6.96
- Enrollment 54.87 34.77
- Enrollment2/1000c 4.42 4.99
- Teacher experience (measured in years) 19.27 2.98
- ln (population) 8.48 1.07
- The share of the population (16–74 years) with completed
lower secondary education as highest educational level (“Low.
sec.”)
0.21 0.06
- The share of the population (16–74 years) with completed
upper secondary education as highest educational level (“High.
sec.”)
0.62 0.04
- Unemployment rate, yearly average 0.03 0.02
- Divorce rate, yearly average 0.06 0.02
- Median income for persons 17 years and older (1000 NOK) 195.10 20.98
Note:a weighted with the inverse of the sampling variance from the ﬁrst step, b deﬁned
in footnote 9, c student weighted average. The data on residential property taxation
is collected in a survey carried out in 2001. Data on student achievement are from
the Norwegian Board of Education. The other data are provided by the Norwegian
Social Science Data Services and Statistics Norway. Neither of these institutions is
responsible for the analysis conducted or for the conclusions drawn.
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